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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do I believe in arbitration? I do. But not in 
arbitration between the lion and the lamb, in which 
the lamb is in the morning found inside the lion. 
Samuel Gompers 
 
Resembling a misunderstood villain,1 securities disputes 
arbitration is often cast in a negative light.2 The investing public 
widely perceives securities arbitration as unfair, with a pro-industry 
 
1. Consider Maleficent, an iconic villain that casts an evil spell on the Sleeping Beauty 
but later comes to care for her and desperately tries to rescind the spell. See generally 
MALEFICENT (Walt Disney Pictures 2014). Consider also Severus Snape, who tried to atone 
for the mistakes he made early in his life when he supported an evil wizard Lord Voldemort, 
by sacrificing his life for Harry Potter. See generally J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE 
DEATHLY HOLLOWS (2007). 
2. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html; Michael 
Hiltzik, No Surprise: Wells Fargo is Leveraging its Arbitration Clause to Win an 
Advantageous Scandal Settlement, L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-wells-settlement-20170331-story.html [https://perma.cc/BJU6-
DBUB]. 
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bias.3 While some of this negative perception is deserved,4 it is not an 
objective reflection on the soundness of the securities arbitration 
process as a whole.5 Yet, negative media portrayal and public opinion 
should serve as an indicator of the need for continuous improvement.6 
Understanding how securities arbitration in the United States 
 
3. An independent survey of 3,087 participants, comprised primarily of investors, 
revealed significant negative perception of the securities arbitration process. However, the 
study also found that investors that doubted the integrity of the securities arbitration process 
did not have a good understanding of it. See generally JILL I. GROSS & BARBARA BLACK, 
PERCEPTION OF FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION: EMPIRICAL STUDY (2008); The 
Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the Cap. Mkts., Ins. And 
Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 41-46 (2005) (statement 
of William Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts)(Mass.) (noting that the 
securities arbitration system is “rigged” in favor of the financial industry and the arbitration 
system should be reformed). 
4. See, e.g., Mun. Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 190 So. 3d 895, 
915 (Ala. 2015)) (finding failure to disclose conflicts of interest by an arbitrator in a Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration constituted evident partiality towards a 
member of the securities industry); see also Kirill Kan, The Importance of FINRA’s Arbitrator 
Selection Process and Clarity in the “Evident Partiality” Standard in the Wake of Morgan 
Keegan, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 188-89 (2012) (noting that FINRA’s arbitrators 
selection process faces recurring issues with arbitrators’ conflicts of interest stemming from 
the small size of arbitrators’ rosters in certain locations, which undermines FINRA’s random 
computer-generated arbitrator selection); Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitrators Do 
Not Grow on Trees, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 76-77 (2008)) (arguing that FINRA’s 
system for selecting arbitrators uses inflexible criteria that pre-judges the potential arbitrator’s 
impartiality merely because of their prior work experience or their relatives’ jobs, thereby 
discouraging capable candidates and perpetuating the problem of having a small pool of 
arbitrators to choose from). But see James Thorne, FINRA Diversifies Arbitrator Pool with a 
Long Road Ahead, FINANCIAL PLANNING MAGAZINE, (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.financial-
planning.com/news/finra-diversifies-arbitrator-pool-with-a-long-road-ahead 
[https://perma.cc/BFA3-SCJD] (“FINRA is making progress toward its goal of having a less 
homogeneous pool of arbitrators, an effort that is likely to take many more years.”). 
5. See Gross, supra note 3, at 59 (noting that “subjective perceptions by arbitration 
participants . . . do not address objective standards of substantive or procedural fairness” of the 
process); The Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the Cap. Mkts., 
Ins. And Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 109th Cong. 41-46 (2005) (statement of Constantine N. 
Katsoris, Wilkinson Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law) (noting that 
significant improvements have been made to the securities arbitration process over time and, 
although imperfect, “the system has on balance worked well.”). 
6. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 413, 480-81 (2006) (noting that securities industry must retain public confidence and 
“can never become complacent and feel as though [it] achieved the perfect dispute resolution 
system.”); David B. Lipsky, The New York Times Attack on Arbitration: Series Highlighted 
Abuses — but also Ignored Arbitration’s Many Advantages, DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6, 6 (2016) 
(noting that media’s portrayal of the arbitration process is “seriously biased and one-sided” but 
“attention to the deficiencies of the contemporary practice of arbitration serves as a warning 
. . . to be diligent in rooting out . . . injustices”). 
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compares to other financially developed common law countries may 
help identify best practices that, if properly implemented, may 
improve public opinion of the securities dispute arbitration process. 
To achieve that goal, this Note will examine the arbitration of 
securities disputes between the investing customers7 and brokerage 
firms,8 with a predominant focus on the securities arbitration process 
in the United States, and compare it to the securities disputes 
resolution programs in the United Kingdom, and in Australia.9 
Securities disputes discussed within this analysis are limited to those 
that occur in the context of financial advice and financial services 
provided in brokerage accounts, including retirement accounts, by 
brokerage firms.10 In the United States, such firms are required to be 
 
7. Note that for the purposes of securities disputes arbitration in the United States, 
“customers,” herein referred to as “investors,” may include not just individual retail investors, 
but also small and large businesses, trusts, charitable organizations, or other types of entities. 
While the federal regulations governing securities disputes arbitration are ambiguous and do 
not define the meaning of the term “customer” beyond stating that a “customer” is not a 
broker-dealer, the Second Circuit held that “a ‘customer’ under FINRA Rule 12200 is one 
who, while not a broker or dealer, either (1) purchases a good or service from a FINRA 
member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA member.” Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Abbar, 
761 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Triad Advisors, Inc. v. Siev, 60 F. Supp. 3d 395, 
397 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that “the definition of ‘customer’ under [FINRA] Rule 12200 and 
its predecessor rules has never been comprehensively defined by the Second Circuit”). 
8. Throughout this analysis, brokerage firms may also be referenced as financial advice 
providers, financial service providers, and simply as brokers. 
9. United Kingdom and Australia were selected for this comparison to the United States 
due to their high degree of economic and financial systems development, as well as their 
analogous legal systems. See THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2018 INDEX OF ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM, https://www.heritage.org/index/ranking [https://perma.cc/CJS2-FLJY] (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2018); see also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, LEGAL SYSTEMS, THE WORLD 
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html 
[https://perma.cc/7R54-PJU8] (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). 
10. Notably, for the United States, securities disputes arising solely out of the financial 
advice and services rendered to investors by the investment advisers registered under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, are not within the scope of this paper. This is primarily due 
to the fact that investment advisers are subject to different standards of care than brokerage 
firms, and disputes between investment advisors and investing public are currently resolved 
primarily through the court system. That is, investment advisory disputes fall outside of the 
traditional securities disputes resolution forums, with only a small portion of disputes 
arbitrated on a voluntary basis. See FINRA, Guidance on Disputes Between Investors and 
Investment Advisers that are Not FINRA Members, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-
mediation/investment_advisers [https://perma.cc/53QU-FXRD] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018); 
Norb Vonnegut, Should Fiduciary Advisers Swear Off Mandatory Arbitration? WALL ST. J., 
(Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-fiduciary-advisers-swear-off-mandatory-
arbitration-1457448422 [https://perma.cc/6N7L-TRTL]. 
2018] SECURITIES DISPUTE ARBITRATION FORUMS 1047 
registered as brokers and, where they also trade for their own account, 
as dealers (“broker-dealers”) under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, which includes registration with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”),11 and with a self-regulatory organization 
(“SRO”) such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority12 
(“FINRA”) or a national securities exchange.13 
Part II of this Note offers a comparative analysis of how 
securities arbitration works in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia today. This comparative analysis includes a review of 
the key aspects and structural safeguards within each forum. Further, 
Part II offers a survey of the varying standards of care required to be 
followed by the securities industry in each country, as the breach of 
these standards is what gives rise to securities disputes. 
Part III of this Note will discuss how changes in the regulatory 
landscape, driven and reinforced by negative public opinion of the 
United States securities dispute resolution process, threaten to 
fragment the system and harm individual retail investors. 
Part IV of this comparison of the intercontinental forums for 
securities dispute resolution will recommend the adaption of certain 
positive enhancements to make securities dispute resolution more 
accessible and transparent. This Note will argue that better 
accessibility and transparency can be achieved through removal of 
 
11. The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) is a federal agency 
principally charged with regulation and enforcement of the securities markets. It has oversight 
over securities broker-dealers, investment advisors, mutual funds and other market 
participants. See Investor.gov, The Role of the SEC, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/R24M-K7LV] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018); see also 
SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/K8GH-
VV2A] (last visited May. 27, 2018). 
12. Of note, FINRA is a self-regulatory organization under 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26), ) 
(2015). It is a successor to and the result of a merger between the National Association of 
Securities Dealers and the enforcement division of the New York Stock Exchange. It was 
established under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is overseen by the SEC. It is the 
primary regulator of the broker-dealer industry in the US. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2015); 
Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1210 (9th Cir. 
1998), abrogated on other grounds by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016); see also Investor.gov, Market Participants, U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, https://investor.gov/introduction-markets/how-markets-work/
market-participants [https://perma.cc/3CFL-LRXV] (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
13. See Investor.gov, Market Participants, supra note 12; see also SEC, Guide to 
Broker-Dealer Registration, ¶ 3.2, https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/
divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html [https://perma.cc/NLV3-PBGE] (last visited Mar. 18, 
2018). 
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cost barriers for retail investors below certain net worth threshold, 
implementation of eligibility criteria requiring pre-dispute 
communication with the financial advice providers, release of 
reasoned written opinions, and streamlining of discovery, evidentiary 
and hearing proceedings. In turn, better accessibility and transparency 
could help mend the public’s pervasively low opinion of the securities 
dispute resolution in the United States, and help restore public trust in 
the fairness of the process. 
Lastly, Part V offers a brief synopsis on the recommendations 
made in Part IV. 
II. HOW SECURITIES DISPUTES ARBITRATION WORKS IN THE 
MOST FINANCIALLY DEVELOPED COMMON LAW COUNTRIES 
IN THE WORLD 
The United States, the United Kingdom and Australia all have 
remarkably well-developed securities markets.14 The United States 
has an estimated ninety to ninety-six million of individual retail 
investors, which translates into about 27.63% to 29.47% of US total 
population participating in the securities markets.15 In contrast, the 
United Kingdom has an estimated twelve million investors, which 
translates to about twenty percent of United Kingdom adult 
population and eighteen percent of United Kingdom total population 
 
14. According to World Economic Forum, in 2012, the US, the UK and Australia ranked 
as number 2, 3 and 5, respectively, out of 62 of the world’s most financially developed 
countries. The measurement was done as part of the Financial Development Report which 
ranks countries based on the robustness of their financial markets, the ease of access to capital, 
the availability of financial advice and ancillary services, and the strength of the financial laws 
and regulations. See World Economic Forum, Financial Development Report, xiii, 2012, 
http://reports.weforum.org/financial-development-report-2012/ [https://perma.cc/V82V-Z5FX] 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018); see also THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 9. 
15. Note that percentages of population participating in securities markets were 
calculated by using the number of investors provided by the following sources and dividing 
that number into the United States’ total population, from the most recent census (i.e. 90/325.7 
= 27.63% and 96/325.7=29.47%). See Kumesh Aroomoogan, More Investors Striking Out on 
Their Own, FORBES, (Jun. 2, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kumesharoomoogan/2016/
06/02/more-investors-striking-out-on-their-own-what-does-all-this-self-directed-trading-
mean/#2172af874db6 [https://perma.cc/3GVU-D2G8]; see also INVESTMENT COMPANY 
INSTITUTE, 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 2 (Apr. 2017) https://www.ici.org/pdf/
2017_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY2A-AGKQ] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, UNITED STATES QUICK FACTS, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/US/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/T398-VRES]. (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
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participating in the securities markets.16 Australia has about 11.2 
million of individual investors which translates to approximately sixty 
percent of Australia’s total adult population participating in the 
securities markets.17 Given these strong securities market 
participation rates, it is unsurprising that disputes between investors 
and financial service providers arise.18 In response, the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Australia all developed robust securities 
dispute resolution forums. This section will discuss each forum in 
turn. 
A. United States of America 
 The United States shares familial roots with the United 
Kingdom and Australia, and as noted above, all three countries have 
analogously well-developed securities markets. Yet the US approach 
to securities dispute resolution diverges from that of England and 
Australia. Although it did not start this way, modern US securities 
arbitration is an extensive, rigorous and formal process administered 
in a way that makes it more complex than its overseas counterparts. In 
this Section, I will discuss how securities arbitration developed and 
works in the United States today.        
 
 
16. See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, BIS RESEARCH PAPER 
NUMBER 261: EXPLORING THE INTERMEDIATED SHAREHOLDING MODEL 27-28 (Jan. 2016); 
see also ShareSoc, UK Stock Market Statistics, https://www.sharesoc.org/investor-
academy/advanced-topics/uk-stock-market-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/38ZT-X3JP] (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
17. See DELOITTE ACCESS AND AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES EXCHANGE, AUSTRALIAN 
INVESTORS STUDY, 1 (2017), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/resources/2017-asx-investor
-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4JN-JN7F]. Note that the incidence of share ownership in 
Australia is high by international standards. See AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES EXCHANGE, THE 
AUSTRALIAN SHARE OWNERSHIP STUDY 49 (June 2015), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/
resources/australian-share-ownership-study-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4MK-F5QT]. 
18. See Katsoris, supra note 6, at 416 (noting that “[a]s the public increasingly invests in 
the securities markets - either directly or indirectly . . . - litigation between the securities 
industry and its customers has mushroomed”). 
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1. Brief History of Securities Arbitration in the United States and 
How it Became the Dominant Forum for Securities Disputes 
Resolution 
The history of US securities arbitration began in 1817, when the 
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) established an arbitration 
forum for resolution of disputes between its member broker-dealers.19 
In 1869, the NYSE allowed for the complaints filed by aggrieved 
investors against the member firms to be resolved through the same 
forum.20 Then in 1968, one of FINRA’s predecessors, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), established its own 
forum for arbitration.21 The NYSE and NASD arbitration forums ran 
separately until June 2007, when they were merged into FINRA.22 
This evolution of a combined expert forum for the securities disputes 
occurred in the context of a broader trend towards arbitration, where 
after the passing of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, the US 
Supreme Court decisions in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon and in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
 
19. See Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration As an Investor 
Protection Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 176 (2016); see also Robert S. Clemente, 
Trends in Securities Industry Arbitration: A View of the Past, Present, and the Future: “The 
Dream, the Nightmare, and the Reality,” N.Y. ST. B.J., 18 (1996) (noting that “[a]s far back as 
the late 1800’s the New York Stock Exchange received commendation for its efforts to 
provide an alternative forum to the courts”). 
20. See Gross, supra note 19, at 175-79 (“In 1869, after the consolidation of the Open 
Board of Brokers with the NYSE Board to form the NYSE, the NYSE amended its 
constitution to officially require members of the Exchange to submit to arbitration whenever 
requested by a nonmember,” with this action primarily driven by “protection of the good name 
and reputation of the NYSE.”); see also Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution 
for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329, 336 (2006). 
21. See Gross, supra note 20, at 181 (“The NASD, an SRO that was growing in size and 
importance to the industry, adopted its first Code of Arbitration Procedure in 1968, providing 
an alternative to the NYSE for the arbitration of customer disputes.”); see also Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t supra, note 3  (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg, 
President, NASD Dispute Resolution), https://www.finra.org/newsroom/speeches/031705-
testimony-subcommittee-capital-markets-insurance-and-government-sponsored 
[https://perma.cc/WL9P-JB72].  
22. See Gross, supra note 19, at 175; see also FINRA Press Release, NASD and NYSE 
Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (July 30, 
2007), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2007/nasd-and-nyse-member-regulation-combine-
form-financial-industry-regulatory-authority [https://perma.cc/PB6E-9M2F] (noting that 
FINRA was a result of the consolidation of NASD and the regulatory enforcement and 
arbitration divisions of the NYSE and became “the largest non-governmental regulatory 
organization for securities brokers and dealers doing business in the United States”). 
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Inc. began to support and emphasize the federal policy of preference 
for arbitration, both in general and specifically in the context of 
securities disputes.23 With the McMahon and Rodriguez decisions that 
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate (“PDAA”) had statutory 
recognition24 and were enforceable in securities disputes, compulsory 
PDAAs became standard in the securities industry and resulted in a 
virtually uniform compulsory arbitration of investor disputes.25 
Furthermore, in rare cases where no PDAA exists, investors have a 
unilateral right to demand arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200.26 
2. How Securities Arbitration Works in the US: FINRA Arbitration 
Process 
As of November 2017, FINRA “operates the largest securities 
dispute resolution forum in the United States,” through its wholly 
owned subsidiary, FINRA Dispute Resolution.27 At this time, ninety-
nine percent of the securities-related disputes in the United States are 
managed through FINRA’s arbitration process. The process is 
administered through one or three-person arbitration panel hearings, 
with seventy-one locations in all fifty states, Sun Juan, Puerto Rico, 
 
23. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) 
(holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements in securities industry are enforceable and 
“resort to the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights 
afforded to petitioners under the Securities Act [of 1934]”).]”); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (noting that the “[Federal] Arbitration Act establishes a 
federal policy favoring arbitration” and requires courts to “rigorously enforce agreements to 
arbitrate”) (internal quotations omitted). 
24. See Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 486; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; see also Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2012). 
25. See Seth E. Lipner, Should Securities Arbitration be Mandatory?, FORBES, (June 29, 
2009), https://www.forbes.com/2009/06/29/lipner-mandatory-arbitration-intelligent-investing-
consumer-choice.html#72550d1d240b [https://perma.cc/8A88-7TBH] (noting that since late 
1980s, “the securities firms uniformly requir[e] that customers sign arbitration agreements” 
and that “since then, virtually all consumer securities cases have gone to arbitration, and the 
system that has been created, now run by FINRA, has been termed mandatory arbitration.”); 
see also FINRA, Final Rep. of the FINRA Disp. Res. Task Force 46 (2015), https://www.finra.
org/sites/default/files/Final-DR-task-force-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZK4-EHAQ] (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
26. See FINRA Rules r.12200 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008); see also FINRA, 
REGULATORY NOTICE 16-25 (2016). 
27. See FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-
mediation [https://perma.cc/TL67-4AKS] (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); see also Gross, supra 
note 19, at 184 (noting that FINRA “administers more than 99% of securities arbitrations in 
the country”). 
1052 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:1043 
and London, United Kingdom.28 The one to three-person arbitration 
panels are comprised of individuals who have gone through FINRA’s 
demanding arbitrator application process. This process includes a 
review for conflicts of interest,29 a background investigation, and a 
general obligation of a continuing duty to disclose special interests of 
the arbitrator as they arise.30 Further, for each dispute, the arbitrators 
are selected randomly, through the Neutral List Selection System, 
which creates a random computer-generated roster of arbitrator 
candidates that parties may select for a given dispute.31 The number 
of arbitrators for each dispute, which ranges from one to three, is 
determined by the amounts at issue in the dispute, with claims up to 
US$100,000 heard by a single arbitrator, and claims involving 
amounts greater than US$100,000 heard by three arbitrators.32 The 
arbitration panel may be comprised public and non-public 
arbitrators.33 In cases involving one arbitrator, the arbitrator is always 
 
28. Id. See FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation, supra note 27; Gross, supra note 19, at 
184; see also FINRA, Dispute Resolution Regional Offices and Hearing Locations, 
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-regional-offices-and-
hearing-locations [https://perma.cc/Y724-RANC] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
29. For example, FINRA Rule 12405(b) establishes, among other things, an obligation 
on the part of the arbitrators “to disclose interests, relationships, or circumstances that might 
preclude an arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determination [in the 
arbitration proceeding] . . . [as] a continuing duty that requires an arbitrator who accepts 
appointment to an arbitration proceeding to disclose, at any stage of the proceeding, any such 
interests, relationships, or circumstances that arise, or are recalled or discovered.” See FINRA 
Rules r.12405(b) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2011); see also FINRA, Your Duty to Disclose, 
(Sept. 2015), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/FINRA-duty-disclose-training-sept-2015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JHC2-YCJE]. 
30. See FINRA Rules r. 12405 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2011); see also Katsoris, 
supra note 6, at 440 (noting the securities dispute resolution forum rules in the US place on the 
arbitrator an ongoing affirmative duty to disclose any conflicts of interest). 
31. See FINRA Rules r. 12400(a) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2011); see also Sandra 
D. Grannum, FINRA Arbitrator Selection: Understanding the Process and Vetting Potential 
Arbitrators, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/
2017-women-in-litigation/materials/arbitrating-in-the-finra-forum.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B67T-TRNK] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018). 
32. See FINRA, Arbitrator Selection, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/
arbitrator-selection [https://perma.cc/9PQP-5Q9L] (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); see also FINRA 
Rules r. 12403 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017). 
33.  See FINRA, Arbitrator Selection, supra note 32; FINRA Rules r. 12403 (Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth. 2017); see also FINRA Rule 12400 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); 
FINRA Rule 12100(y) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017) (defining public arbitrator 
stringently as an independent party that has not been affiliated with a broker-dealer, investment 
adviser or other type of an industry insider in direct or indirect way); FINRA Rule 12100(r) 
(Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017) (defining non-public arbitrator as anyone who is not a 
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public, unless there is a consensual agreement to the contrary between 
the arbitration participants.34 In cases involving three arbitrators, each 
party has the right to select a panel with no ties to the securities 
industry.35 
Notably, FINRA has no statutory cap on the value of the claims 
it is permitted to arbitrate, or on the amount it may award in 
resolution of the claims with respect to compensatory or punitive 
damages.36 Recovery of punitive damages in securities disputes is a 
pro-investor characteristic of FINRA securities arbitration, as ability 
to obtain punitive damages in securities disputes in federal courts is 
limited.37 This makes arbitration attractive for investors that believe 
they have a strong case for punitive damages.38 
 
public arbitrator, i.e. persons working within the securities industry or otherwise directly or 
indirectly connected to it). 
34.  See FINRA, Arbitrator Selection, supra note 32; FINRA Rule 12100(r) & (y) (Fin. 
Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); FINRA Rules r. 12400 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); 
FINRA Rules r. 12403 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); see also FINRA Rules r. 12402(a) 
(Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017). 
35. See FINRA Rule 12403(c)(1)(A) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017) (“Each 
separately represented party may strike any or all of the arbitrators from the non-public 
arbitrator list by crossing through the names of the arbitrators.”); see also FINRA, New 
Optional All Public Panel Rules, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/new-
optional-all-public-panel-rules [https://perma.cc/6H5U-E9AP] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) 
(noting that in 2011 SEC approved a new FINRA rule that allows the parties to an arbitration 
to select all public arbitrators to hear their case). 
36. See SHAHLA F. ALI, CONSUMER FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT: PRINCIPLES, SYSTEMS AND PRACTICE 125 (2013); see also Cory 
Alpert, Financial Services in the United States and United Kingdom: Comparative Approaches 
to Securities Regulation and Dispute Resolution, 5 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 75, 92 
(2008) (noting that “FINRA Arbitration has no statutory cap on the value of awards”). The 
case that established that securities arbitrators may award punitive damages, even if such 
damages are not available under the laws of the state which govern the dispute, was 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. The decision broadened the remedies available 
to customers in arbitration compared to traditional court proceedings. See generally 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
37. Under existing federal statutory and common law framework governing securities 
disputes, punitive damages are not available in actions alleging violations of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a) 
(1934) (“No person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of [the 1934 
Act] shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in 
excess of the actual damages to that person . . .”); see also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 
(2d Cir. 1968) (holding that punitive damages are not available for violations of § 10(b) of the 
1934 Act). Further, although the text of the Securities Act of 1933 does not explicitly preclude 
punitive damages, courts “have endeavored to treat the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts in pari materia and to 
construe them as a single comprehensive scheme of regulation.” Globus v. Law Research 
Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d. Cir. 1969). Thus, punitive damages are generally also 
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FINRA conducts its arbitration proceedings in adherence with 
the Uniform Code of Arbitration,39 to ensure that the arbitration 
process is fair and efficient.40 In order to initiate an arbitration claim, 
investors must be eligible for arbitration from a timeliness 
perspective, and bring their claim within six years of occurrence of 
the event that gave rise to the claim.41 Assuming eligibility 
requirement is met, investors are encouraged to retain legal counsel42 
and submit a Statement of Claim, which can be done online.43 The 
pleading standards employed by FINRA are fairly liberal, only 
 
not available in the Securities Act of 1933 actions. See Globus, 418 F.2d at 1292; see also 
Robert B. Hirsch & Jack L. Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards Under Federal Securities Acts, 
47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 72, 72 (1971). 
38. See Stephen J. Choi & Theodore Eisenberg, Punitive Damages in Securities 
Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 497, 498 (2010) (drawing conclusion 
after analysis of “a data set of over 6,800 securities arbitration awards . . . that claimants 
prevailed in 48.9 percent of arbitrations and that 9.1 percent of those claimant victories 
included a punitive damages award” in claims with “egregious broker misbehavior”); see also 
Peter M. Mundheim, The Desirability of Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: 
Challenges Facing the Industry Regulators in the Wake of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
197, 223 (1995) (noting that possibility of a punitive damages award in securities arbitration 
provides an incentive for investors to use the forum, particularly for investors with small 
compensatory claims). 
39. The Code of Arbitration was developed by the Securities Industry Conference on 
Arbitration (“SICA”), which is comprised of the representatives of the investors, academia and 
the industry. See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON ARB. IN THE SEC. INDUS. 
11 (2007), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/White-Paper-on-Arbitration-in-
the-Securities-Industry-October-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM7Q-QUQJ] (noting that the 
Code of Arbitration was developed by SICA and although it has not been updated since the 
1970s, SICA and the industry’s participants, including investors and plaintiffs’ attorney 
interest groups, meet regularly regarding enhancements to the securities arbitration process); 
see also Katsoris, supra note 6, at 420-22. 
40. See Katsoris, supra note 6, at 420. 
41. See FINRA Rules r. 12206 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2011); see also FINRA, 
REGULATORY NOTICE 09-36, http://finra.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/f/i/
finra_09-36.pdf [https://perma.cc/A529-FY4Y]. 
42. Although representation pro se is permitted, securities disputes can be extremely 
complex and parties are better advised to have an experienced attorney. See, e.g., FINRA 
Rules r. 12300(b) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017) (setting forth the rules for submission of 
claim and supplementary information for pro se claimants); see also Lipner, supra note 25 
(noting that “[t]here will be monthly statements for the lawyers to scrutinize, profit and loss 
analyses to create, prospectuses and SEC filings to read and pick apart and industry rules to 
study” and “there are numbers, lots of numbers . . . [t]his is specialized, detail-oriented stuff.”). 
43. See FINRA, Arbitration Online Claim Filing, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-
mediation/online-claim-filing [https://perma.cc/4C9Q-Z682] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); see 
also FINRA, ARBITRATION CLAIM FILING GUIDE 4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/arbitration-claim-filing-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2P3-6YPQ]. 
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requiring that investors file a Statement of Claim “specifying the 
relevant facts and remedies requested.”44 The respondent broker-
dealer would then have forty-five days to serve the claimant with a 
Statement of Answer.45 Failure to respond within the specified period 
may lead to a default judgment against the offending firm.46 
After the Statement of Claim and the Statement of Answer have 
been exchanged, parties have a pre-hearing teleconference to agree on 
a hearing schedule and discuss motion schedules.47 Notably, with 
respect to the motion practices in FINRA arbitration, pre-hearing 
dispositive motions such as a motion to dismiss are considered on 
fairly limited grounds and are actively discouraged by the language of 
FINRA’s relevant regulations, such as FINRA Rules 12504 and 
12206.48 Moreover, hostility to pre-hearing dispositive motions is 
evident from the fact that the arbitrators’ panel must assess forum fees 
against the party filing the motion, and if the panel finds the motion to 
be in “bad faith” or “frivolous,” additional sanctions against the 
motion proponent may be imposed.49 Similarly, discovery is 
significantly less extensive than federal court discovery proceedings, 
and parties may object to discovery requests found overly 
 
44. See FINRA Rules r. 12302(a) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); see also FINRA, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PARTY REFERENCE GUIDE 20 (Sept. 2014), https://www.finra.org/sites/
default/files/Partys-Reference-Guide%20(Sept%2012%202014).pdf [https://perma.cc/78VP-
N9SW] (noting that a claim does not need to be in special form and only needs to be a written 
narrative setting forth the facts of the dispute including dates, names and amounts requested 
for relief). 
45. See FINRA Rules r. 12303 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); see also FINRA, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PARTY REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 44, at 30. 
46. See FINRA Rules r. 12801 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); see also FINRA 
Rules r. 13801 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017). 
47. See FINRA Rules r. 12500 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); see also FINRA 
Rules r. 13501 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008). 
48. See FINRA Rules r. 12504 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017) (noting that 
“[m]otions to dismiss a claim prior to the conclusion of a party’s case in chief are discouraged 
in arbitration”); see also FINRA Rules r. 12206(b) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2011) (noting 
that even for motions to dismiss filed on the grounds of time limit where claimants are not 
meeting the six year eligibility requirement, an arbitration panel may not grant such a motion 
without an in-person or telephonic conference, and that a decision to grant such a motion must 
be made by a unanimous panel and must be accompanied by a written explanation, which is 
remarkable considering that generally securities arbitration decisions do not require an 
explanation). 
49. See FINRA Rules r. 12504(a) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); see also FINRA, 
Motion to Dismiss and Eligibility FAQ, http://www.finra.org/industry/faq-motion-dismiss-and-
eligibility-rules-faq [https://perma.cc/6T2B-J76P] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
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burdensome.50 FINRA’s rules require cooperation between the parties 
to the full extent needed to expedite the arbitration process.51 
Procedures for admissibility of information found as part of discovery 
are likewise substantially more liberal than the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which the arbitrators are not required to follow, although 
production of documents does not guarantee their admissibility.52 
Lastly, after the pre-hearing motions and discovery, the case 
proceeds to a hearing,53 following which the panel would render a 
decision on the dispute, typically within a thirty day period, without 
being required to provide a rationale for the award.54 FINRA permits, 
but does not require, award reasoning.55 In 2017, FINRA reported 
average turnaround time for an arbitration claim, from the beginning 
 
50. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (noting that 
more limited discovery is permitted in arbitration as compared to traditional court 
proceedings); see also FINRA, Discovery, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-
mediation/discovery [https://perma.cc/LA4L-JQ5P] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
51. See FINRA Rules r. 12505 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008); see also FINRA 
Rules r. 13505 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008). 
52. See FINRA Rules r. 12508 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017); FINRA Rules r. 
12604 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008); see also FINRA, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
DISCOVERY GUIDE (2013). Notably, although FINRA’s evidentiary procedures are less formal 
than those of a federal court, they are based on Federal Rules of Evidence. See FINRA 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 4D N.Y. PRAC. COM. LITIG. IN N.Y. STATE COURTS § 97:45 (4th ed., 
2017). 
53. See FINRA Rules r. 12600 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008); FINRA Rules r. 
13600 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2009). 
54. See FINRA Rules r. 12904(f) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008) (noting that “[t]he 
award may contain a rationale underlying the award”)(emphasis added); see also Tara Siegel 
Bernard, Taking a Broker to Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, (July 18, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/07/19/your-money/a-closer-look-at-the-arbitration-process-for-
investors.html (noting that “[w]hether investors win or lose, they rarely know arbitrators’ 
reasoning because they don’t have to provide any explanation” because although investors can 
request an explanation for a fee, they will receive it “only if the opposing party also agrees; 
legal experts say that typically doesn’t happen .”); see also FINRA Rules r. 12514 (Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth. 2017) (holding that all parties in a securities dispute, except for disputes 
involving amounts less than $50,000, must file for an explained decision at least 20 days 
before the first hearing date, subject to a $400 fee); FINRA Rule 12904(g) (noting that 
explained decisions must be requested early in the arbitration process, and may be provided 
“only when all parties jointly request an explained decision”) (emphasis added). But see SR-
FINRA 2018-012, PROPOSED RULE CHANGE TO ELIMINATE THE FEE FOR EXPLAINED 
DECISION, http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/rule_filing_file/SR-FINRA-2018-012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AS36-KHGJ] (noting that FINRA recently submitted a proposed rule change 
to the SEC seeking to eliminate the $400 fee FINRA arbitration system currently imposes for 
all explained decisions). 
55. See Siegel Bernard supra note 54; see also FINRA Rule 12904(g) supra note 54. 
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of the dispute through its resolution, was 14.5 months.56 In cases 
involving simplified decisions, or in cases expedited due to the 
advanced age of the customer bringing the claim, the turnaround time 
can be cut by nearly half, to an average of 7.3 months.57 In contrast, a 
federal lawsuit involving a securities transaction on average takes 689 
days or nearly 23 months to resolve.58 
Securities arbitration awards in the United States are binding on 
all parties involved.59 Further, they are made publicly available and 
must be paid within thirty days unless a motion to vacate the award is 
filed.60 However, while the motion to vacate the award is available, 
judicial review of arbitration awards is very deferential.61 There are 
limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, which typically 
include corruption, fraud, evident partiality, or undue means in how 
the award was produced, with similarly limited grounds for 
modification of awards, typically only where there is a material 
mistake or miscalculation.62 FINRA also regularly publishes dispute 
 
56. See FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics 2017, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-
and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); see also FINRA Stats 
12/17: With the Year-End Statistics Available from FINRA-ODR, We Take a Detailed Look at 
“The State of the Forum”, SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR BLOG, http://www.
sacarbitration.com/blog/finra-stats-1217-year-end-statistics-available-finra-odr/ (Feb. 2, 2018). 
57. See Dispute Resolution Statistics 2017, supra note 56. 
58. See generally INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM, CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (2009). For historical 
perspective and detailed empirical analysis of time to disposition of private civil litigation, see 
Terrence Dungworth & Nicholas M. Pace, Statistical Overview of Civil Litigation in Federal 
Courts, THE RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIV. JUST. 19-21 (1990). 
59. See FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation Overview, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-
and-mediation/overview [https://perma.cc/S8V2-Z3FE] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); see also 
FINRA, Awards FAQ, ¶1, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/faq-awards-faq 
[https://perma.cc/YGT8-UKGF] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
60. See FINRA Rules r. 12904(h)-(j) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2018); see also 
FINRA Rules r. 13904 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2018). 
61. See, e.g., Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(“A federal court’s review of an arbitrator’s decision . .  . is extremely narrow and exceedingly 
deferential.”) (internal quotations omitted); 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 
526 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We accord a high degree of deference to an arbitrator’s decision. An 
arbitration award must be upheld when the arbitrator offers even a barely colorable 
justification for the outcome reached.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
62. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2012); UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Mann, No. 14-10621, 2014 
WL 1746249, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2014) (noting the limited grounds for modification of 
a securities arbitration award). 
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resolution statistics, providing transparency into various data points 
on the arbitrations that it handles.63 
A notable feature of the securities arbitration process in the 
United States is that class-action proceedings in arbitration are not 
permitted by FINRA’s rules.64 However, under FINRA Rule 
2268(d)(3) PDAAs may not “include any condition that . . . limits the 
ability of a party to file any claim in court permitted to be filed in 
court under the rules of the forums in which a claim may be filed.”65 
This reflects FINRA’s position that to the extent that class-action 
remedy is available through other forums, such as federal courts, it 
may not be waived through prior agreement.66 FINRA Rule 12204(b) 
further accounts for the possibility where a claim grounded in the 
same facts and involving the same defendants is certified as a putative 
class action while simultaneously pending as arbitration, and holds 
that such claim would not be arbitrated unless parties to the 
arbitration opt-out of the class action participation.67 As a reflection of 
FINRA’s rules and to the extent permitted by the law, most PDAAs 
between investors and broker-dealers include provisions for class-
action waivers. However, under FINRA’s Rule 12204(d), PDAAs 
 
63. See FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56; FINRA, Statistics, 
https://www.finra.org/newsroom/statistics [https://perma.cc/YKH7-MP5T] (last visited Mar. 7, 
2018). 
64. See FINRA Rules r. 12204(a). But see FINRA Rules r. 12312 (providing for a more 
limited joinder of claims by multiple claimants “if the claims contain common questions of 
law or fact” and either “assert any right for relief jointly and severally” or “arise out of the 
same transaction or occurrence”). Notably, while FINRA’s stance on not permitting class 
action arbitrations is controversial and open to challenge, it is not without reason. United 
States class actions have long been criticized as “entrepreneurial,” where the class counsel, 
typically a law firm managing the action on a contingent fee basis, exerts overt control over 
the case and class representatives, and stands to get paid amounts that may be grotesquely out 
of proportion to the economic benefits that the class as a whole may receive. Moreover, 
FINRA member firms, the broker-dealers that would become the defendants in such class 
actions if FINRA changes its stance, are understandably apprehensive of class actions as 
consolidation of cases may increase the risk of a significant award. See, e.g., Debra Lyn 
Bassett, The Future of International Class Actions, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 21, 23-24 (2011); Alissa 
Piccione, Class Warfare: Preventing Investor Casualties by Importing England’s GLO into 
America’s Class Action Arbitrations, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 417, 437 (2013); Elliott J. Weiss, 
Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 LAWL. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (2001). 
65. See FINRA Rules, r. 2268 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2011), see also Anna Prior, 
Arbitration vs. Class Actions in Investing Disputes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2015, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/arbitration-vs-class-actions-in-investing-disputes-1447246800. 
66.  See FINRA Rules r. 2268 supra note 65;, see also Prior, supra note 65. 
67. See FINRA Rules r. 12204(b) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008); see also FINRA 
Rules r. 13204(b) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2012). 
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may not be enforced until a member of a class-action proceeding in 
federal court is (1) denied class certification, (2) loses the 
certification, is (3) excluded from the class action, or (4) actively opts 
out of it.68 
FINRA’s stance on class actions is in line with the broader 
federal jurisprudence on class-action waivers in commercial disputes. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court held that class action arbitration was 
permissible but only by explicit agreement between the parties 
involved, with an inference that class action arbitrations would also 
need to be permitted by the forum in which the parties agree to 
arbitrate.69 In both 2011 and 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that class 
arbitration waivers were permissible and enforceable.70 Furthermore, 
in 2015 the Supreme Court held that state level statutes that 
prohibited class action arbitration waivers were invalid on federal 
preemption grounds, holding that “[state law] that does not place 
arbitration contracts on equal footing with all other contracts” and 
“does not give due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration,” 
is unenforceable.71 Nonetheless, in July 2017, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)72 issued a rule that prohibited class-
action waivers in PDAA for certain financial institutions,73 although 
the rule was promptly struck down by Congress in October of 2017.74 
 
68. See FINRA Rules r. 12204(d) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2008); see also French 
v. First Union Sec., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 818 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (holding that agreement to 
arbitrate was unenforceable while a class action was pending). 
69. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664 (2010) (noting 
that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is 
a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so”) (emphasis in the original). 
But see Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013) (holding that where 
arbitrator interpreted agreement between parties concerning authorization of lack thereof for 
class proceedings, such arbitrator’s interpretation holds “however good, bad or ugly.”). 
70. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 536 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); see also Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
71. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).); see also, E Jin Lee, 
Whose Law Is It Anyway? The Contract Interpretation Problem in U.S. Arbitration 
Jurisprudence, 27 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 495, 496 (2016)  (discussing DIRECTV holding). 
72. CFPB has the power to regulate consumer financial products and services and has 
been tasked under § 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act with the study of PDAA. 12 U.S.C. § 5491 
(2012); 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012). 
73. CFPB Arbitration Agreements Rule, 12 CFR § 1040 (2017) (reserved) (revoked by 
Pub. L. No. 115-74). 
74. See Greg Iacurci, Senate’s takedown of the CFPB class-action rule may pave way for 
challenge to FINRA policy, INVESTMENT NEWS, (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.investmentnews.
com/article/20171025/FREE/171029959/senates-takedown-of-the-cfpbs-class-action-rule-
 
1060 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:1043 
CFPB’s attempt to open a path for class-actions in financial services 
disputes, while unsuccessful, demonstrates that FINRA’s rule 
prohibiting class actions is controversial and may be challenged.75 
3. Standards of Care Prevalent in the US Brokerage Industry 
The brokerage segment of the financial services industry has 
long operated under what is known as a “suitability standard of care.” 
Under FINRA Rule 2111(a), broker-dealers “must have a reasonable 
basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment 
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the 
customer.”76 This reasonable basis is generally formed through 
analysis of multiple relevant factors, which include customer’s age, 
annual income, experience with financial markets, investment 
objectives, risk tolerance, liquid net worth and tax status.77 
Furthermore, in the United States broker dealers are required to act 
with reasonable care in all investor communications and have sound 
basis for investor recommendations, and base all investor 
communications “on principles of fair dealing and good faith.”78 
While the suitability standard is not a best interest fiduciary 
standard,79 over the last few years, there has been a movement 
towards a more stringent fiduciary standard for the US brokerage 
industry.80 This shift is driven by the evolution of the industry, the 
 
may-pave-way-for [https://perma.cc/95JH-93XP]; see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 
Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-vote-wall-street-regulation.html?_r=0. 
75. See generally supra, notes 64, 74. 
76. See FINRA Rules r. 2111 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2014). 
77.  Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Notably, unlike securities broker-dealers, investment advisers registered under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, are subject to the fiduciary standard. See SEC, General 
Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, (Mar., 31, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.ht [https://perma.cc/8MN9-GAWH]; see also S.E.C. 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (holding that under Section 206 
of the Investment Advisers Act, investment advisers have fiduciary duties to their clients and 
must disclose all potential conflicts of interest). 
80. See, e.g., Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Comment Letter to 
the DOL on its Fiduciary Rule Proposal (July 20, 2015), http://www.sifma.org/issues/
item.aspx?id=8589955445 [https://perma.cc/QB2N-6KSR]; FINRA, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Conflict of Interest Rule and Related Proposals (July 17, 2015), https://www.finra.
org/sites/default/files/FINRACommentLetter_DOL_07-17-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M87-
5VQK]; Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Proposed Best Interest of the 
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need for investor protection, and the desire for a uniform standard in 
how investment advisers and broker-dealers are treated.81 
In April 2016, the US Department of Labor (“DOL”)82 adopted a 
set of regulations(“Conflict of Interest Rule”), which set forth an 
updated framework for rendering financial advice in employment 
retirement plan accounts (“plans”)83 and the individual retirement 
accounts (“IRAs”).84 The stated purpose of the Conflict of Interest 
Rule is to expand the applicability of the statutory definition of 
“fiduciary” put forward in ERISA and the Code, to all investment 
professionals that provide retirement accounts with investment 
advice, to prevent conflicts of interest and require such providers to 
adhere to an impartial best interest standard of conduct.85 ERISA, 
which is largely mirrored by the Code in this respect, defines 
fiduciary as “any person [who] . . . renders investment advice for a fee 
or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys 
or other property of [a retirement] plan.”86 While the Conflict of 
Interest Rule does not establish an all-inclusive interpretation of what 
constitutes fiduciary investment advice, it does significantly expand 
the previously existing interpretation, defining investment advice as 
“a communication that, based on its content, context, and 
presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that the 
 
Customer Standard for Broker-Dealers (Jun. 3, 2015), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/proposed-best-interests-of-the-customer-standard-for-broker-dealers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HQH3-2L5B]; Richard G. Ketchum, Remarks From the 2015 FINRA Annual 
Conference (May 27, 2015), https://www.finra.org/newsroom/speeches/052715-remarks-2015-
finra-annual-conference [https://perma.cc/3ARV-HN5M]. 
81. See supra note 80. 
82. DOL has the power to regulate retirement accounts. See 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (2012). 
Retirement accounts comprise a large segment of accounts serviced by the financial industry 
and broker-dealers in particular, totaling $27.2 trillion as of September 30, 2017. See 
Investment Company Institute, Retirement Assets Total $27.2 Trillion in Third Quarter 2017 
(2017), https://www.ici.org/research/stats/retirement/ret_17_q3 [https://perma.cc/5CTW-
HK62]. 
83. Employee retirement plans are tax-advantaged accounts established under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 1001. 
Individual retirement accounts, which are similarly tax-advantaged, are established under the 
Internal Revenue Code (“Code”). See 26 U.S.C. § 408. 
84. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” Conflict of Interest Rule – Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 CFR pt. 2509, 
2510 and 2550). 
85. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” Conflict of Interest Rule – Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 68, 20,947. 
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012). 
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advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a particular course of 
action.”87 This definition of what constitutes fiduciary investment 
advice covers many types of communications with customers that 
were previously not covered.88 The Conflict of Interest Rule had an 
original applicability timeframe of April 2017, however was delayed 
by the DOL and instead went into partial effect in June 2017, with all 
elements of the rule scheduled to become effective in July 2019.89 
After the change in political administration in early 2017, the DOL 
was asked to re-assess the Conflict of Interest Rule.90 However, there 
is political opposition to substantive changes to the rule and no 
material changes were made to date, although both full applicability 
and enforcement of the rule have been deferred to 2019.91 
 
87. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” Conflict of Interest Rule – Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,997. 
88. For example, conversations with clients concerning rollovers or distributions, or any 
discussions where a call-to-action or customization of the conversation occurred based on the 
customer’s needs may be considered fiduciary investment advice under the Conflict of Interest 
Rule. Id. at 20,966. 
89. The DOL rule, formally titled “Definition of the Term ‘Fiduciary’; Conflict of 
Interest Rule -- Retirement Investment Advice,” was published in the Federal Register on 
April 8, 2016, became effective on June 7, 2016, and had an original applicability date of April 
10, 2017, with a phased implementation period ending on January 1, 2018. On April 7, 2017, 
the DOL extended the applicability date of the rule by 60 days from April 10, 2017, to June 9, 
2017 and leaving the phased final implementation date of January 1, 2018 intact. 82 Fed. Reg. 
16902 (Apr. 7, 2017). Subsequently, on November 29, 2017, the DOL extended the final 
implementation date for the rule by 18 months from January 1, 2018 to July 1, 2019, due to 
concern that, without a delay in the applicability dates, parties affected by the rule, including 
investors, may be unduly adversely affected and may incur undue expense. 82 Fed. Reg. 56545 
(Nov. 27, 2017). 
90. On February 3, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum 
directing the DOL to evaluate the Conflict of Interest Rule. See Memorandum on the Fiduciary 
Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201700095 (FEB. 3, 2017). But see Jessica 
Karmasek, Trump Administration Sued Over Delay of Fiduciary Rule, FORBES, Nov. 1, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2017/11/01/trump-administration-sued-over-
delay-of-fiduciary-rule/#7d717f2e7501 [https://perma.cc/2B5F-LYD9]. As a result of this 
Presidential Memorandum, the DOL published a request for information from the public, 
seeking to better examine the Conflict of Interest Rule. See 82 Fed. Reg. 31278, 31279 (Jul. 6, 
2017).  
91. Karmasek, supra note 90; see also U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Conflict of Interest Final 
Rule, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/
completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-2 [https://perma.cc/5JL5-P9YA] (last visited Nov. 27, 
2017); see also U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Extends Transition Period for 
Fiduciary Rule Exemptions (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/
ebsa20171127-0 [https://perma.cc/PZ5U-A2TS] (noting that “from June 9, 2017, to July 1, 
2019, the Department [of Labor] will not pursue claims against fiduciaries working diligently 
and in good faith to comply with the Fiduciary Rule”). 
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While the fiduciary standard imposed by the DOL’s Conflict of 
Interest Rule is different from the suitability standard prevalent in the 
US securities industry today, the suitability standard already in many 
ways requires the broker-dealer to act in the best interest of the client. 
Conduct that can be justified as suitable but nevertheless appears not 
to be in the best interest of the client is typically addressed by FINRA 
through FINRA Rule 2010,92 which is a substantive conduct rule that 
broadly holds that the broker-dealers “shall observe high standards of 
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.”93 While 
the rule is very brief and does not define “high standards” or the 
meaning of “just and equitable” conduct, FINRA routinely employs 
this catch-all rule, referred to in the industry as its “long arm,” to 
sanction broker-dealers whose conduct is found to be questionable or 
unethical.94 
Furthermore, where the activity by a financial services 
institution is especially egregious,95 it may be held accountable by the 
SEC and by private parties under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 which gives private parties an 
implied right of action in federal court for fraud.96 Courts have also 
 
92. Formerly NASD Rule 2110. See FINRA Rules r. 2010 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 
2008). 
93. See Ian K. Peck, Is Self-Regulation the Answer? Assessing the Proposal for FINRA 
Oversight of Investment Advisers, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 384, 385 (2013) (“FINRA Rule 
2010 is a common tool used by FINRA Enforcement attorneys and has been called FINRA’s 
‘long arm’ rule. When bringing a case against a member firm or a registered representative, 
FINRA Enforcement attorneys can argue that conduct or inaction violated Rule 2010.”); see 
also Jonathan Harris, Rule 2010: FINRA’s Long Arm, LAW360, (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/228028/rule-2010-finra-s-long-arm [https://perma.cc/NBV3-
MACR]. 
94.  Peck, supra note 93, at 384-85. 
95. See Press Release, SEC, Broker Charged With Giving Special Access to IPOs for 
Cash Kickbacks (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-234 
[https://perma.cc/J3UW-NHR9] (bringing action for alleged egregious violations of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also Press Release, SEC, Stock Trader 
Charged in Insider Trading Ring (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-228 [https://perma.cc/7BHF-28ZH]. 
96. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 136 (2011) 
(noting that “[a]lthough neither Rule 10b–5 nor the statute it interprets, § 10(b) of the Act, 
expressly creates a private right of action, such an ‘action is implied under § 10(b).’”) (quoting 
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971)). 
For a more detailed overview, albeit critical, of the Janus decision, see generally Edward 
Pekarek & Genevieve Shingle, The Land of Litigation Make Believe:  Janus Capital Group, 
Inc., et al. v. First Derivative Traders A Case Comment, 19 PIABA B.J. 1 (2012). 
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held that a broker-dealer is a fiduciary where it exercises discretion 
over customer assets and acts in a position of trust and confidence 
similar to that of a registered investment adviser.97 
As it stands today, the standards of care in the US broker-dealer 
industry are a patchwork of the suitability standard for taxable 
brokerage accounts, and of the fiduciary standard for retirement and 
tax-advantageous accounts covered by the Conflict of Interest Rule, 
as well as for certain accounts over which the broker-dealer exercises 
discretion or in which it holds the position of trust similar to that of an 
investment adviser. However, there is support within the industry for 
a uniform best-interest standard that would require broker-dealers to 
act in the customers’ best interest and would apply uniformly across 
all account types.98 
B. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
England may be the great-great-great-great-great-grandmother of 
the US securities arbitration process, as multiple accounts suggest that 
early types of securities arbitration disputes originated there sometime 
in the 14th century.99 But the UK’s securities dispute resolution 
process moved in the opposite direction from the United States over 
time, shedding complexity and evolving to become comparatively 
more nimble and simplified. In this Section I will discuss how 
securities arbitration works in the United Kingdom today, and how it 
compares to the US’s FINRA dispute resolution process. 
 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002); Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens 
& Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208, 212 (7th Cir. 1993); MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 1989); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953-954 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 
165 (6th Cir. 1981). 
98. See Mark Schoeff, SEC Commissioners Cheer Clayton’s Efforts on Fiduciary Rule 
Collaboration, INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 23, 2018, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20180223/FREE/180229947/sec-commissioners-cheer-claytons-efforts-on-fiduciary-rule 
[https://perma.cc/YR9B-ZWY4]; see also FINRA, Comment Letter on Proposed Conflict of 
Interest Rule and Related Proposals (July 17, 2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/FINRACommentLetter_DOL_07-17-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q89L-SAEW]. 
99. See Gross, supra note 19, at 175 (noting that securities arbitration in the US is likely 
a “carryover from England where it had been utilized to solve disagreements among members 
of trade groups since the fourteenth century); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: 
Community and Coercion under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 969-72 
(1999). 
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1. How Securities Arbitration Works in the United Kingdom: 
Financial Ombudsman Service 
In contrast to the United States securities disputes arbitration 
process, which is fairly formal and not entirely unlike litigation, albeit 
more streamlined and cost-efficient, the UK securities dispute 
resolution scheme is significantly less formal in comparison. 
Established by the UK Parliament under Part XVI of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act of 2000, which governs the conduct of 
financial services firms in the United Kingdom under the oversight of 
several agencies,100 the UK securities resolution scheme is 
administered through the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”).101 
The statutory objective behind the FOS dispute resolution scheme 
expressly emphasized the need for its informal nature, noting that it 
should be a scheme that would address investor grievances “quickly 
and with minimum formality.”102 FOS securities disputes resolution 
process is not compulsive, and investors103 may always elect to pursue 
court litigation rather than FOS arbitration process.104 Compulsive 
arbitration agreements and PDAAs are uncommon in the United 
Kingdom, and clauses in brokerage agreements compelling arbitration 
have generally been found void by the United Kingdom courts, under 
 
100. The UK agencies principally responsible for oversight over brokerage firms and 
financial advice providers are the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority. See FCA, UK Regulators, Government and Other Bodies, https://www.
fca.org.uk/about/uk-regulators-government-other-bodies [https://perma.cc/7SH4-LNXK] (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
101. See GERARD MCMEEL & JOHN VIRGO, FINANCIAL ADVICE AND FINANCIAL 
PRODUCTS: LAW AND LIABILITY 485-88 (2001); see also Fin. Ombudsman Serv, about the 
Financial Ombudsman Serv., http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/about/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/SS4T-67JG] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
102.  Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, § 225 (Eng.); see also FINANCIAL 
CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK (Aug. 2017), DISP 3.1.4 G. 
103. Of note, like in FINRA arbitration but perhaps less broadly, investors or 
“customers” in FOS securities dispute arbitration scheme also include not just individual retail 
investors, but also small businesses and charities. See Rhoda James, The New Dispute 
Resolution System in the U.K. Financial Services Industry, J. INT’L FIN MKT. I.F.M. 191, 191 
(2002); see also MCMEEL, supra note 101, at 494. 
104. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK (Mar. 2018), DISP. 2.5.1 
R. Notably, FOS has compulsory jurisdiction over many activities of the financial sector in the 
UK, such as lending money, payment services, and ancillary banking services. However, 
financial advice and securities services are only subject to voluntary FOS jurisdiction. See 
FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK (Mar. 2018), DISP 2.3.1 R. 
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the Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations.105 
Thus, the arbitration system administered by the FOS is entirely 
voluntary. 
Similar to FINRA, FOS has certain eligibility requirements, 
precluding claims that pertain to events older than six years and 
claims “three years from the date on which the complainant became 
aware (or ought reasonably to have become aware) that he had cause 
for complaint.”106 Unlike FINRA, FOS may not handle disputes that 
involve amounts greater than UK£150,000, such disputes must be 
handled through the court system.107 Also unlike FINRA, the FOS has 
a formal requirement that prior to the submission of a complaint to 
FOS, the investor communicate with the business they are 
complaining about, for up to eight weeks, to resolve the complaint 
through the internal review mechanisms that the business is required 
to maintain for resolution of aggrieved investors’ complaints.108 If the 
investor is not satisfied with how the business addressed his or her 
complaint, the investor may submit a complaint to FOS by phone, 
online109 or in writing.110 FOS securities dispute resolution forum is 
absolutely free of charge to investors.111 This is because the UK 
legislature believed that “access to a free, independent dispute-
 
105. See The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999/2083, at 
5-6, 1(q). For a more general overview of unfair terms in consumer contracts, including in the 
context of financial advice, see RICHARD LAWSON, EXCLUSION CLAUSES AND UNFAIR 
CONTRACT TERMS (2011). 
106. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK (Jan. 2018), DISP. 2.8 R; 
see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 494. 
107. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK (Jan. 2012), DISP. 3.7.4 
R; see also Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Compensation, http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/
publications/technical_notes/compensation.html [https://perma.cc/H85Q-GJK6] (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2018). 
108. See Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Before we get involved, http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/faq/businesses/before_we_get_involved.html [https://perma.cc/PD5B-
3VV7] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017); see also FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA 
HANDBOOK (Jan. 2019), DISP. 1.6.2 R. 
109.  Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Before we get involved, supra note 108; see also Fin. 
Ombudsman Serv., How to Complain, https://help.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/help [https://
perma.cc/98LW-3A77] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
110. See Fin. Ombudsman Serv., How to Complain, supra note 109. 
111. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Why Consumers Don’t Pay, http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/faq/businesses/answers/funding_a9.html [https://perma.cc/4RRS-7S2W] 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018); see also FIN. OMBUDSMAN SERV., ANNUAL REVIEW 2015/2016 1 
(2016), http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/annual-review-2016/ar16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UC3Z-H3JM] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018). 
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resolution service was essential to underpinning public confidence in 
financial services.”112 Further, the forum is also partially free to the 
businesses, where the brokerage firm does not have to pay case fees 
on the first twenty-five complaints per year, after which point a case 
fee of £550 will apply.113 Similar to FINRA, the FOS has a low 
pleading standard and merely requires investors to submit a written 
statement explaining events that led to the complaint, and include 
relevant documents.114 
With respect to the more procedural aspects of the FOS 
securities dispute resolution process, it differs from FINRA’s in that 
unlike FINRA’s, FOS arbitration does not require a hearing.115 FOS 
reviews the case and works with the business and the investor to 
gather relevant documentation as needed, but no formal hearings are 
required to be held, although the FOS may order that a hearing or a 
telephone conference be held if it considers it appropriate for any 
given complaint.116 Furthermore, FOS does not have formal 
evidentiary procedures or discovery, although all financial services 
firms and their authorized persons are required to cooperate with the 
FOS and produce documents on request, in the format requested by 
the FOS, and within the time limits specified by the FOS.117 The FOS 
has the ability to “exclude evidence that would otherwise be 
admissible in a court or include evidence that would not be admissible 
 
112. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., Our Funding, http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/
faq/businesses/answers/funding_a1.html [https://perma.cc/N85V-9YXX] (last visited Feb. 18, 
2018). It should be noted that although FOS is an independent regulatory body not controlled 
by the UK financial industry, it is primarily funded by annual levies on the businesses it 
regulates, as well as through arbitration case fees paid by the businesses. See id.; see also FIN. 
OMBUDSMAN SERV., ANNUAL REVIEW 2015/2016, supra note 111, at 105. 
113 Fin. Ombudsman Serv., When the Case Fee is Payable, http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/faq/businesses/answers/funding_a5.html [https://perma.cc/8QTA-FAG6] 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018); see also FIN. OMBUDSMAN SERV., ANNUAL REVIEW 2015/2016, 
supra note 111, at 105. 
114. See How to Complain, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/consumer/complaints.htm [https://perma.cc/DF56-A88Z] (last visited Mar. 
19, 2018); see also FAQs, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/faq/answers/complaints_a1.html [https://perma.cc/CR7Q-R2CC] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
115. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK, (Release 25, Mar. 2018) 
DISP. 3.5.5R; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 500. 
116. Id. 
117. See FCA HANDBOOK, DISP. 3.5.8 R8R. Notably, failure to comply with FOS 
requirements to provide evidence may be referred to court for disciplinary action. See FCA 
HANDBOOK, DISP. 3.5.11 G11G; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 501. 
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in a court” and may “accept information in confidence” where only a 
summary or edited version will be made available to the other party in 
the dispute.118 These aspects of the FOS securities dispute resolution 
process are unlike their counterparts in the FINRA process, which as 
discussed above are rooted in the US Federal Rules of Evidence, 
albeit abbreviated and somewhat less formal. 
Sixty nine percent of the FOS securities disputes cases are 
resolved within a twelve month timeframe, which is almost three 
months shorter than FINRA’s turnaround time.119 However, FOS’s 
complaint volumes were significantly higher than FINRA’s, with 
438,802 complaints resolved for the year ended March 30, 2016.120 
After the FOS considers the evidence and renders a decision in the 
case, it gives both parties “a signed written statement of the 
determination, giving the reasons for it.”121 In this aspect the FOS 
process also differs from FINRA’s as FINRA’s rules permit, but do 
not require, an explanation of reasons for the arbitrators’ decisions.122 
The maximum amount of award that the FOS arbitration may order is 
UK£150,000, unlike FINRA which has no statutory cap as to the 
amounts of the awards.123 However, interest and costs that may be 
awarded are excluded from the UK£150,000 cap,124 and whenever the 
FOS finds that additional compensation is warranted, it may make a 
recommendation to the offending firm to pay the extra amount.125 
Notably, because the FOS securities disputes resolution scheme is 
free for investors and the FOS’s position is that investors do not need 
professionals such as attorneys and expert witnesses to bring and 
resolve FOS complaints, awards of costs (including, by inference, for 
expert witnesses) are not common.126 Furthermore, the FOS has a 
one-sided power to award the costs incurred by the investors in the 
arbitration process, although such costs may not be awarded to a 
 
118. See FCA HANDBOOK, DISP. 3.5.9 R9R; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 501. 
119. See FOS, ANNUAL REVIEW 2015/2016, supra note 111, at 38. 
120. Id. at 3. See also Annual Review 2016/2017: Data in More Depth 56, FIN. 
OMBUDSMAN SER., http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/annual-review-2017
/pdf/Datamoredepth-AR2016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZG8-9QXE]. 
121. See  FCA HANDBOOK, DISP. 3.6.6R; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 502. 
122. See supra note 54. 
123. See supra note 36. 
124. See FCA HANDBOOK, DISP. 3.7.5G; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 503. 
125. See FCA HANDBOOK, CONRED. 1.6.19G; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 
502. 
126. See FCA HANDBOOK, DISP. 3.7.10; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 503. 
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brokerage firm and their recovery is only available to investors.127 
With respect to punitive damages, which are not available in 
securities disputes in United States federal courts but are available in 
FINRA arbitration of securities disputes,128 the FOS arbitrators do not 
have the authority to award punitive damages.129 This difference 
between the FOS securities disputes resolution scheme and the 
FINRA securities arbitration process illustrates that the US arbitration 
system gives very broad latitude to the arbitrators in devising 
remedies to the aggrieved parties.130 
FOS arbitration awards are binding on the financial advice 
providers but not on the investors.131 Investors may choose to accept 
the FOS determination within the time period specified by the FOS, in 
which case the award becomes binding on both parties and may be 
enforced in court if not paid, or the investor may choose not to accept 
the arbitration award and proceed to court litigation.132 Once the 
determination by the investor is made whether to accept the award, 
 
127. Id. 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
129. Notably, this inability to award punitive damages is not specific to the FOS 
securities arbitration forum. Under the United Kingdom law, arbitrators generally do not have 
the power to award punitive damages, this power is reserved to the courts. Moreover, punitive 
damages are generally not recognized under UK law, except in very limited “cases (i) of 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional acts by government servants; (ii) where the 
defendant’s conduct had been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which might well 
exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; (iii) where expressly authorized by statute.” 
This is in marked contrast to the United States approach. Despite the fact that the FAA does 
not even mention punitive damages and nothing within the United States statutory framework 
governing arbitration explicitly empowers arbitrators to award punitive damages, the United 
States courts nonetheless have recognized the arbitrators’ right to award punitive damages and 
generally uphold arbitral punitive damage awards under the broader premise of the federal 
policy favoring arbitration and affording extreme deference to arbitration decisions. See 
International Dispute Resolution Committee of New York State Bar Association, Report on 
Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitration, 5 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 103, 108 
(1992). See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
130. Of note, the broad latitude available to the US arbitrators in devising remedies for 
the victims is not specific to the securities disputes, and holds true with respect to United 
States arbitration process in other industries. The federal policy favoring arbitration does not 
limit the arbitration remedies to those traditionally available in law. For example, Section 12 
(a)(5) of the Uniform Arbitration Act, provides that “[t]he fact that the relief was such that it 
could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not a ground for vacating or 
refusing to confirm an award.” See Uniform Arbitration Act § 12 (a)(5) (1955); see also Payer 
& Wildfoerster v. Catholic High Sch. Ass’n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 672 (N.Y. 1976) (noting that 
remedies available in arbitration need not be confined to the traditional remedies at law). 
131. See FCA HANDBOOK, DISP 3.7.12 R; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 496-97. 
132. See FCA HANDBOOK, DISP 3.7.13, DISP. 4.2.5 R. 
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the FOS may specify the date by which the amount awarded must be 
paid by the respondent business.133 The details of the awards are not 
made public, although the FOS is required to maintain a register of 
each money award and every six months it publishes a public 
statistics report on the complaints data and awards.134 
As for the comparison of the treatment of class actions in the 
United Kingdom, like FINRA, the FOS securities disputes resolution 
system does not permit collective actions.135 More generally, although 
US class actions trace their roots back to the United Kingdom,136 they 
have come very far from the United Kingdom model in that regard, 
with the United Kingdom embracing a more cautious approach with 
respect to collective actions and limiting them to very few 
mechanisms, under which actions for damages are only available in 
limited circumstances, with greater focus on injunctive and other 
equitable relief.137 
2. Standards of Care Prevalent in the UK Financial Advice Industry 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-08, the 
United Kingdom implemented some key changes to the way the 
financial advice providers get compensated for their services by 
banning commissions, one of the defining features of brokerage 
 
133. See id., DISP 3.7.2(B) G; see also McMeel, supra note 101, at 503. 
134. See, e.g., Complaints Data, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.
financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/complaints-data.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); 
Annual Reviews and Directors’ Reports, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.
financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/annual-reviews.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); see 
also FCA HANDBOOK, DISP. 3.7.7 R. 
135. See FCA HANDBOOK, DISP 2.11 G – 2.1.6 R, (setting forth the introduction to the 
FOS dispute resolution scheme and making it clear, by inference, that collective actions are not 
supported); see also FCA, ENFORCEMENT GUIDE, 102-04, https://www.handbook.fca.org.
uk/handbook/document/eg/EG_Full_20160321.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUT2-ASXL] (noting 
that FCA is empowered to engage in public representative enforcement procedures, a form of 
collective action in the United Kingdom, where it may bring claims on behalf of consumers to 
obtain collective redress). 
136. The earliest form of class action can be traced back to a group action brought by the 
parishioners against the parish rector for failing in financial management of the church, in 
Master Martin Rector of Barkway v. Parishioners of Nuthampstead. See STEPHEN YEAZELL, 
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 54 (YALE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS, 1987). 
137. See JOANNE BLENNERHASSETT, A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF MULTI-PARTY 
ACTIONS, 45-49 (2016); see also FCA HANDBOOK, EG, supra note 135. 
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industry in the United States.138 This change in turn led to change in 
designations applicable to the retail investor financial advice 
providers in the United Kingdom, which are now known solely as 
investment advisers and are more akin to the US investment advisers 
than to the US broker-dealers.139 This change is largely what 
underpins the differences in the standards of care for financial advice 
providers in the United States and United Kingdom, as discussed in 
more detai l below. 
Under Part X of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, 
the UK legislature conferred rule-making powers on the FCA, 
including the power to set the standards of care for the financial 
advisers and brokerage firms.140 The FCA has in turn developed and 
promulgated rules that set forth most of the standards that the industry 
adheres to.141 In 2012, the FCA implemented an overarching initiative 
known as the Retail Distribution Review (“RDR”), which was aimed 
at eliminating bias and conflicted advice in the UK financial 
markets.142 Under the RDR, all retail financial advice providers 
dealing with individual investors were grouped into two categories: 
independent and restricted.143 
 
138. See Evan Cooper, Regulatory Changes Abroad Hint at the DOL Fiduciary Rule’s 
Potential Impact, INVESTMENT NEWS (Apr. 17, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20160417/FREE/160419944/regulatory-changes-abroad-hint-at-the-dol-fiduciary-rules-
potential [https://perma.cc/7EPE-7UDE] (noting that commissions were prohibited and instead 
advisers must now charge customers a fixed fee or an hourly rate or a combination thereof); 
see also Financial Advice Market Review 17, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/famr-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYF7-
88CQ] (noting the high standard for rendering financial advice in the United Kingdom and 
stating the commissions were banned to eliminate “unacceptable conflicts of interest”). 
139. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 10, 79. 
140. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Part X, §§ 138–150; see also 
Authorization, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/authorisation 
[https://perma.cc/5CPT-VDY7] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
141. Id. See also Handbook and Guidance, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY 
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/handbook [https://perma.cc/4LNT-LVLR] (last visited Mar. 19, 
2018) (noting that “[a]ll regulated firms must comply with the [FCA] rules,” with financial 
advisers and investment managers, UK equivalents of US broker-dealers, being among the 
regulated firms). 
142. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY,  RETAIL DISTRIBUTION REVIEW 2-3 (2012), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-guidance/fg12-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RSL-
G48Y]; see also Post-Implementation Review of Retail Distribution Review, FINANCIAL 
CONDUCT AUTHORITY https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/post-implementation-
review-retail-distribution-review [https://perma.cc/8FQV-SMTR]. 
143. FCA, RETAIL DISTRIBUTION REVIEW, supra note 142, at 2. 
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Independent advisers that do not hold themselves out as 
specialists in a particular product and operate as full-service advisers, 
have to provide all financial advice to investors in compliance with a 
“twin test” of being (1) “based on a comprehensive and fair analysis 
of the relevant market;” and (2) “unbiased and unrestricted.”144 This 
requires analysis of all available products that exist in the marketplace 
and precludes advisors from being “bound by any form of agreement 
with a retail investment product provider[s] that restricts . . . the 
firm’s ability to provide a personal recommendation which is 
unbiased and unrestricted.”145 
Restricted advice is all advice that is not independent, which 
may occur when financial services provider specializes in a specific 
type of products.146 The same standard of care applies to the restricted 
advice provider as to the independent one, but restricted advice 
providers are not required to analyze all available products in the 
marketplace for a best fit for the client, and are instead obligated to 
make a detailed disclosure about the restricted nature of their 
service.147 
Overall, both independent and restricted financial advice 
standards require the financial advisory firms to “take reasonable care 
to ensure suitability of . . . advice and discretionary decisions for any 
customer,” conduct business “with due skill, care and diligence,” 
manage “conflicts of interest fairly,” and communicate pertinent 
information to investors “in a way that is clear, fair and not 
misleading.”148 This standard of care, with focus on suitability of 
advice and disclosure of all pertinent information, resembles the US 
suitability standard for the brokerage industry, although the 
restrictions on entering into agreements with investment product 
providers makes it more stringent and closer in spirit to the US 
fiduciary standard.149 Similar to the United States, the UK law also 
recognizes the existence of fiduciary duties by the financial advice 
providers to the investors where financial advisers have custodianship 
 
144. Id. at 6-7. 
145. Id. at 7. 
146. Id. at 7-8. 
147. Id. at 8. 
148. See FCA HANDBOOK, PRIN. 2.1.1 R; see also FCA, Principles of Good Regulation, 
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/principles-good-regulation [https://perma.cc/7ZCF-SPR9] (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
149. See supra text accompanying note 79; see also Cooper, supra note 138. 
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and control over investor’s assets and have assumed discretionary 
authority to manage such assets.150 
C. Australia 
While England may be the great-great-great-great-great-
grandmother of the US securities arbitration, Australia is more like its 
overachieving cousin that always does more. This is evident in 
Australia’s not one, but two securities dispute resolution forums, both 
of which are faster and more efficient in their administration of 
securities disputes than FINRA. In this Section I will discuss how 
securities arbitration works in Australia today, and how it compares to 
the UK’s FOS and the US’s FINRA dispute resolution processes. 
1. How Securities Arbitration Works in Australia: Financial 
Ombudsman Service Australia and the Credit and Investment 
Ombudsman 
In contrast to the US and UK securities disputes arbitration 
processes, which are both centralized in one regulatory body, 
Australian securities dispute resolution program is more varied and 
decentralized in comparison. Australian financial markets are 
regulated by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(“ASIC”) and the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(“APRA”).151 Of the two agencies, ASIC has the primary 
responsibility for approving and overseeing external dispute 
resolution forums.152 Two main forums are currently approved and 
 
150. See McMeel, supra note 101, at 279-82; see also LAW COMMISSION, FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES OF INVESTMENT INTERMEDIARIES, 34-46 (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325509/41342_HC_368_LC350_Print_Ready.pd
f [https://perma.cc/8HHM-SKHD]. 
151. See Our Role, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, 
http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/ [https://perma.cc/RW2G-6MWY] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018); About APRA, AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/2T6Z-EMRS] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
152. See ASIC, CORPORATE PLAN 2017-18 TO 2020-21, 21 (2017), http://download.
asic.gov.au/media/4439405/corporate-plan-2017-published-31-august-2017-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A6SD-SUUG]; see also External Dispute Resolution, AUSTRALIAN 
SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/contact-us/how-to-
complain/external-dispute-resolution-what-to-do-if-you-are-dissatisfied-with-a-decision/ 
[https://perma.cc/MP2H-ALYR] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018)(“ASIC’s role is to provide 
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operating for resolution of securities disputes in Australia: (i) the 
Financial Ombudsman Service Australia Limited (FOSA) dispute 
resolution forum which is the bigger of the two, closing a total of 
39,481 disputes in the fiscal year ended June 30, 2017, of which 1,791 
were specific to the financial advice and securities brokerage activity 
comparable to those of US broker-dealers;(ii) the Credit and 
Investment Ombudsman (“CIO”) dispute resolution forum, which 
resolved a total of 4,145 disputes in the fiscal year ended June 30, 
2016.153 The primary difference between the two forums is that FOSA 
is geared towards handling complaints for larger institutions, 
including not only brokerage firms but also large banks and insurers, 
whereas the CIO primarily handles disputes for the firms it regulates 
which are ninety-seven percent non-banks, sole traders and smaller 
financial service providers.154 
Both FOSA and CIO dispute resolution processes are more 
similar to the UK’s FOS approach to securities dispute resolution than 
 
oversight to EDR schemes to ensure they are working . . . effectively in dealing with consumer 
complaints.”). 
153. See Approved Dispute Resolution Schemes, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & 
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/dispute-
resolution/asic-approved-dispute-resolution-schemes/ [https://perma.cc/7ST2-8DGL] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018). Notably, Australian legislature also set up a separate dispute resolution 
forum reserved solely for complaints dealing with superannuation funds. This alternative 
dispute resolution scheme is the smallest of the three schemes, with 2,051 complaints resolved 
in the fiscal year ended June 30, 2017. Because superannuation funds and products are 
generally more similar in nature to pension plans and insurance than to the traditional 
securities, this specialized alternative dispute resolution forum is not necessarily comparable to 
the FINRA dispute resolution processes and is thus outside of scope of this paper. See What 
We Do, SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL, http://www.sct.gov.au/pages/about-
us/about-the-tribunal [https://perma.cc/3EHN-SLGH] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); see also 
SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL ANNUAL REPORT 2016-17 2 (2017), http://www.
sct.gov.au/dreamcms/app/webroot/uploads/documents/Superannuation%20Complaints%20Tri
bunal%20Annual%20Report%202016-17%20-%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QYW-45UT] 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018); FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE AUSTRALIA, ANNUAL REPORT 
2016-17 62 (2017), https://www.fos.org.au/custom/files/docs/fos-annual-review-20162017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C7NQ-W557] [hereinafter FOSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2016-17]; CREDIT AND 
INVESTMENTS OMBUDSMAN LIMITED, ANNUAL REPORT 2016 7 (2016), https://www.cio.org.
au/assets/1212450/CIO%20Annual%20Report%20-%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4JZ-
QGZD] [hereinafter CIO, ANNUAL REPORT 2016]. 
154. See CIO, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 153, at 5; see also Media Release –
Ramsay Review Findings – A Solution Looking For a Problem, CREDIT AND INVESTMENTS 
OMBUDSMAN, https://www.cio.org.au/news-and-events/media-releases/media-release-ramsay-
review-findings-a-solution-looking-for-a-problem.html [https://perma.cc/V6NG-F8XY] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
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to FINRA’s process. This is because both forums are free of charge to 
the consumers and fairly informal in nature, with FOSA in particular 
emphasizing that its resolution of the investor complaints is done with 
“minimum formality and technicality.”155 Further similarity to the UK 
process is that FOSA and CIO securities disputes resolution processes 
are not compulsive, and investors156 may always elect to pursue court 
litigation rather than the dispute resolution arbitration process.157For 
both FOSA and CIO forums, the dispute resolution determination will 
be binding on the respondent financial services provider only if the 
consumer chooses to accept the FOSA or CIO determination.158 
Furthermore, both FOSA and CIO forums have a cap on the monetary 
compensation limits for the disputes they consider, with both FOSA 
and CIO noting that they can accept claims up to AU$500,000, 
however the maximum compensation each agency is allowed to 
recommend is AU$309,000.159 Both forums may also award interest 
costs on an award payment to investors, which are not counted as part 
 
155. See What We Do, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE AUSTRALIA, 
http://www.fos.org.au/about-us/what-we-do/#id=compensation-caps [https://perma.cc/BXG5-
NC2C] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); FOSA, ANNUAL REPORT 2016-17, supra note 153, at 3; 
see also About Us, CREDIT AND INVESTMENTS OMBUDSMAN, https://www.cio.org.au/about-
us.html [https://perma.cc/W7L2-F89A] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
156. Notably, unlike in US FINRA arbitration and the UK FOS dispute resolution which 
have fairly broad definitions of what constitutes a “customer” for which disputes may be 
resolved, Australian securities dispute resolution schemes are limited to investors that are 
either individual consumers or small businesses. See Our Small Business Jurisdiction, 
FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE AUSTRALIA, http://www.fos.org.au/small-business/our-
small-business-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/L7DT-HWZW] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); 
Complaints We Cover, CREDIT AND INVESTMENTS OMBUDSMAN, https://www.cio.org.au/
complaint-resolution/complaints-cio-covers.html [https://perma.cc/P7E4-PVA8] (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2018). 
157. See Dispute Resolution Process in Detail, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE 
AUSTRALIA, http://www.fos.org.au/resolving-disputes/dispute-resolution-process-in-detail.
jsp#id=decision [https://perma.cc/R3Z3-DNZU] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); About 
Ombudsman Determinations, CREDIT AND INVESTMENTS OMBUDSMAN, https://www.cio.org.
au/cases/about-ombudsman-determinations.html [https://perma.cc/U4EG-HRRN] (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2018). 
158. Id. 
159. See Before You Lodge a Dispute, Limits on Claims and Compensation,  FINANCIAL 
OMBUDSMAN SERVICE AUSTRALIA, http://www.fos.org.au/resolving-disputes/before-you-
lodge-a-dispute/#id=limits [https://perma.cc/DT3H-E7BW] (last visited Apr. 14, 2018); 
Complaints CIO Covers, CREDIT AND INVESTMENTS OMBUDSMAN, https://www.cio.org.
au/complaint-resolution/complaints-cio-covers.html [https://perma.cc/8R56-38MS] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
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of the AU$309,000 monetary compensation limit.160 With respect to 
punitive damages, neither FOSA nor CIO forums allow for punitive 
damage awards, in line with the UK’s FOS securities dispute 
resolution forum but different from the US’s FINRA arbitration of 
securities disputes, where punitive damages are available.161 
With respect to eligibility requirements, similar to the UK’s FOS 
process, both FOSA and CIO require investors to first work with the 
financial services provider about which they are looking to lodge a 
complaint, before investigating and resolving the dispute through 
their forums.162 Financial service providers are allowed up to forty-
five days to review and address the consumer complaints through 
their internal complaint handling procedures, with a shorter timeframe 
of twenty-one days available in cases of financial hardship, after 
which point FOSA or CIO will start their process if the complaint is 
not resolved to the investor’s satisfaction.163 FOSA and CIO also have 
a time limit similar to that of FINRA and FOS, where claims that may 
be brought for resolution must fall within six years from the date the 
investor became aware of the loss (or should have reasonably become 
aware).164 Pleading standards are low, where investors are simply 
required to summarize their complaint without the use of “any formal, 
legal or technical language,” and provide copies of the documents that 
may be relevant to the resolution of their dispute.165 
 
160. See FOSA, TERMS OF REFERENCE § 9.5; CIO, CREDIT AND INVESTMENTS 
OMBUDSMAN RULES §§ 9.4-9.5 [hereinafter CIO RULES]. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 37, 129. Notably, outside of alternative 
securities dispute resolution schemes, Australian courts permit punitive damages, although 
“they are considered an extraordinary remedy appropriate only in cases of truly outrageous 
conduct.” This approach is not as limited as that of the United Kingdom under Rookes v. 
Barnard, but not as broad as the availability of punitive damages in the United States. John Y. 
Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 
407-08 (2004). 
162. See CIO RULES, supra note 160, at § 9.1; see also Making a Complaint, CREDIT 
AND INVESTMENTS OMBUDSMAN, https://www.cio.org.au/complaint-resolution/making-a-
complaint.html [https://perma.cc/LQA8-FTWT] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); Dispute 
Resolution Process in Detail, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE AUSTRALIA, http://www.fos.
org.au/resolving-disputes/dispute-resolution-process-in-detail.jsp#id=decision 
[https://perma.cc/2QCZ-YR88] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
163. Id. 
164. FOSA, TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 160, at § 15.2; CIO RULES, supra note 
160, at § 6.3. 
165. See CIO RULES, supra note 160, at § 14.5; see also Lodge a Dispute, FINANCIAL 
OMBUDSMAN SERVICE AUSTRALIA, https://odf.fos.org.au/ [https://perma.cc/K9WU-V7TC] 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
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With respect to the procedural aspects of the FOSA and CIO 
securities dispute resolution processes, again there are strong 
similarities to the UK’s FOS process, and differences from FINRA’s 
process which is more formal. FOSA and CIO both work with the 
financial services provider named in the dispute, as well as the 
complaining investor, to gather relevant documentation as needed, 
and the financial service providers and investors are obligated to 
comply, however, these forums do not have formal evidentiary 
procedures or discovery, and are not bound by any rules of 
evidence.166 Neither forum requires for a hearing between the parties 
to be held prior to issuing a determination of the securities dispute, 
although CIO’s dispute resolution rules specifically state that it may 
convene a hearing “if it is satisfied that doing so would lead to the 
more efficient and effective resolution of the complaint.”167 
FOSA and CIO appear to have shorter dispute resolution 
timeframes than FINRA and FOS, with FOSA reporting that eighty-
six percent of disputes it closed in the fiscal year ended June 30, 2017 
were resolved within three months,168 and CIO reporting that eighty-
three percent of the disputes it closed in the fiscal year ended June 30, 
2016169 were resolved within six months.170 The rules for both forums 
require that when a final determination on a dispute is made, a 
decision supported by reasons be provided to parties involved in the 
dispute.171 This is in line with UK’s FOS process, but not FINRA’s.172 
While FOSA and CIO securities dispute determinations are not 
required to be made public, unlike FINRA’s, both agencies are 
required to publish statistical reports and analysis of the complaints 
data on at least an annual basis.173 
 
166. See FOSA Rules 8.1, 8.4 and 16.5; CIO Rules, supra note 160, at §§ 3.4, 16.1. 
Notably, failure by comply with requests for information within specified time frames allows 
FOSA and CIO to make adverse evidentiary inferences against the party that failed to respond 
to the evidence request. Id. 
167. See CIO RULES, supra note 160, at §§ 22.2, 22.3. 
168.  FOSA ANNUAL REPORT 2016-17, supra note 153, at 64. 
169. The corresponding 2017 data was not available at the time of this analysis. 
170.  CIO ANNUAL REPORT 2015-16, supra note 153, at 7. 
171. FOSA TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 160, at § 8.7; CIO RULES, supra note 
160, at §  23.4. 
172. Supra text accompanying notes 54 and 121. 
173. FOSA TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 160, at § 12.2; CIO RULES, supra note 
160, at §  41.2. 
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Lastly, with respect to availability of class action remedy in 
FOSA and CIO forums, CIO’s rules and website are silent as to 
availability of class action arbitration, whereas FOSA’s website 
specifically identified class actions as an area of concern, stating that 
class actions are handled by the Supreme Court of Victoria or the 
Federal Court of Australia, and noted that pursuant to Term of 
Reference (FOSA’s rules of conduct) 5.2, the agency has discretion to 
“refuse to consider a dispute if there is a more appropriate place to 
deal with a dispute” implying that class actions are not going to be 
accepted within the FOSA dispute resolution forum.174 
2. Standards of Care Prevalent in the Financial Advice Industry of 
Australia 
Following the global financial crisis of 2007-08, Australia’s 
legislature passed a number of legislative changes that had the effect 
of banning commissions and implementing a best interest fiduciary 
standard for financial advice providers.175 However, the fiduciary 
standard in Australia is subject to certain “reasonable step 
qualifications” which ultimately mean that Australian financial advice 
providers are, on balance, fiduciaries only when dealing with small 
and unsophisticated retail investors.176 This approach is different from 
those taken in the United States and United Kingdom, as explained in 
more detail below. 
Under Part 1, subsection 5B of the Corporations Act of 2001, 
Australian legislature gave ASIC the power to administer the Act and 
 
174. Opt-Out Class Actions, FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE CIRCULAR, Issue 6 
(2011) http://www.fos.org.au/the-circular-6-home/optout-class-actions/ [https://perma.cc/
R32K-GX7W]; see also Michael Legg, Redressing Mass Harm: ADR, Class Actions and 
Regulatory Responses, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES REDRESS AND REGULATION 
SEMINAR 32-38 (2014). 
175. These legislative changes are collectively known as Future of Financial Advice 
Laws (“FOFA”). Background and Implementation of FOFA, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & 
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/future-
of-financial-advice-reforms/fofa-background-and-implementation/ [https://perma.cc/U3HU-
HTQ9]. See also Cooper, supra note 138 (noting that FOFA enactment was “a reaction to 
cases of wealth management firm malfeasance during the 2008” and resulted in ban on 
commissions but otherwise had little effect on the financial advice and securities industry). 
176. Id. See also Regulatory Guide 175, Licensing: Financial Product Advisors – 
Conduct and Disclosure, RG 175.10, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS 
COMMISSION, (Nov. 2017) http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4543983/rg175-published-14-
november-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FUY-ARU6]. 
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thus set the standards of conduct for the financial advisers and 
brokerage firms.177 ASIC has in turn developed a set of 
comprehensive regulations that form the standards of care for the 
Australian securities industry. 178 These standards require that the 
financial service providers such as brokerage firms “do all things 
necessary to ensure that financial services . . . are provided efficiently, 
honestly and fairly” and “have adequate arrangements in place to 
manage . . . conflicts of interest.”179 Australian financial service 
advice providers also have additional, extensive statutory obligations 
concerning disclosure of pertinent information to investors, which 
vary depending on whether the advice provided is personalized or 
generic180 and whether it is provided to a retail or institutional 
client.181 Generally, Australian financial advice and brokerage 
services providers must provide clients with the so-called written 
“Financial Service Guides” before any advice is given, and provide 
additional “Statement of Advice” with an explanation of the basis for 
advice in each personalized advice instance with a retail client.182 
Where the financial advice is personalized and provided to retail 
clients,183 financial advisers have fiduciary duties and must prioritize 
 
177. The Corporations Act is the primary federal statute governing financial services 
industry in Australia. See Corporations Act of 2001, Volume 1, ch 1 pt 1.1.5B (Austl.); see 
also Laws We Administer, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, 
http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/laws-we-administer/ [https://perma.cc/6KPB-GEHF] 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
178. See Giving Financial Products Advice, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS 
COMMISSION, http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/giving-financial-
product-advice/ [https://perma.cc/5DNF-2S85] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); see also Codes of 
Conduct, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://asic.gov.au/for-
consumers/codes-of-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/R6KE-AFPD] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
179. See Regulatory Guide 36 Licensing: Financial Product Advice and Dealing, RG 
36.94-96, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, (June 2016) 
http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3889417/rg36-published-8-june-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4F6S-YUJQ]; see also supra note 178. 
180. ASIC defines “personal advice” as financial product advice that is given after 
consideration of the investor ‘objectives, finances and needs, whereas “generic advice” is all 
other advice. See Regulatory Guide 175, supra note176, at RG 175.10. 
181.  See Regulatory Guide 36, supra note 179, at RG 36.96-36.100. 
182.  See Regulatory Guide 175, supra note 176,  at RG 175.3. 
183. A “retail client” is not simply an individual client, further considerations as to 
whether the client is “retail” within the meaning of the Corporations Act and ASIC’s 
regulatory scheme depend on the client’s financial status and investment experience. For 
example, investors who are sophisticated investors or have assets of at least AU$2,500,000 and 
gross income of AU$250,000, or receive advice on transactions involving amounts in excess 
of AU$500,000, are not considered “retail clients.” See Corporations Act of 2001 (Cth) ss 
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client’s interests above their own and “act in the best interest of the 
client” through advice that includes disclosures as to the basis for 
such advice, warnings regarding various risks associated with 
securities, and disclosure of any related party conflicts of interests.184 
This standard of care is different from the US suitability standard and 
limited fiduciary standard for retirement accounts and certain 
discretionary and control relationships, and from the UK reasonable 
care and suitable advice standard which likewise recognizes certain 
fiduciary relationships, not limited to retirement accounts but 
determined by exercise of a relationship of trust or control and 
discretion over investor’s assets.185 Thus, Australia’s securities laws 
impose the best interest fiduciary standard on all personalized advice 
to individual investors who are not experienced and not wealthy, thus 
predicating Australian standard of care for financial advice providers 
on the client’s profile rather than on the financial service provider’s 
business designation. 
III. THREAT OF FRAGMENTATION AND LOSS OF AN EXPERT 
FORUM IN HANDLING OF THE SECURITIES DISPUTES IN THE 
US 
Why are these securities dispute resolution forums and the 
varying standards of care important? They are important because they 
help preserve confidence in the securities markets, which rely on 
broker-dealers to function effectively. Further, they help the investing 
public achieve quicker, less expensive, and more uniform resolution 
of conflicts that arise in the context of financial advice. However, the 
way the securities disputes are resolved in the US may change 
significantly in the near future. This is due to the fact that the 
enforcement mechanism for the Conflict of Interest Rule186 comes 
into effect on July 1, 2019, and both the DOL and enterprising 
securities plaintiffs’ attorneys may start to bring litigation that would 
traditionally be handled through the FINRA securities dispute 
resolution forum, to federal courts. Even if the Conflict of Interest 
 
761G(7), 761GA (Austl.); see also Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) regs 7.1.19-7.1.28 
(Austl.). 
184. See Corporations Act of 2001(Cth) pt,  7.7 div. 2 (Austl.); see also Regulatory 
Guide 175, supra note 176, at RG 175.1, RG 175.20. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 97, 150. 
186. See supra Part II (A)(3). 
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Rule is further delayed or amended, attempts at similar regulatory 
undertakings with similar effects should be expected. Coupled with 
the pervasively negative public view of the securities industry,187 this 
may pose a serious threat to an expert securities disputes resolution 
forum that has developed over the last two centuries. This impending 
conflict is addressed in more detail below. 
According to FINRA, in 2017 and in 2016, the top 5 controversy 
types in customer arbitrations were:188 
1. Breach of fiduciary duty, with 2,002 cases in 2016 and 
1,899 cases served in 2017. 
2. Misrepresentation, with 1,670 cases in 2016 and 1,663 cases 
served in 2017. 
3. Negligence, with 1,862 cases in 2016 and 1,662 cases 
served in 2017. 
4. Failure to supervise, with 1,802 cases in 2016 and with 
1,621 cases served in 2017. 
5. Suitability, with 1,606 cases in 2016 and 1,606 cases served 
in 2017 (flat, no change year-over-year). 
As these statistics indicate, FINRA has substantial expertise in 
handling arbitrations pertaining to the breach of fiduciary duty. This 
is a decisive differentiator that should not be taken lightly, as the 
financial industry is highly complex and there is substantial value in 
FINRA’s specialized forum with experienced arbitrators, compared to 
limited or no experience in this technical field for the likely majority 
 
187. According to the 2016 Makovsky Wall Street Reputation Study, which involved a 
survey of 228 executives across the financial services industry, and of 1,079 persons 
representative of the U.S. general population, 86% of the financial industry respondents 
viewed the financials services industry’s reputation as still being adversely impacted by the 
2007-2008 financial crisis, over a decade after its occurrence, and regardless of remedial 
efforts and the remarkable market rebound. Furthermore, 27% of the general population 
respondents reportedly lost trust in the financial sector, and 91% believed that another 
financial crisis was likely. MAKOVSKY, 2016 WALL STREET REPUTATION STUDY (2016). See 
also Paul R. La Monica, Banks Know that Customers Hate Them, CNN MONEY (June 17, 
2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/17/investing/banks-crisis-reputation/index.html [https://
perma.cc/3FT3-V28M].  
188. See Top 15 Controversy Types in Customer Arbitration, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-
statistics#top15controversycustomers (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); see also George H. 
Friedman, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: FINRA Improves Dispute Resolution 
Transparency, SAC BLOG (Dec. 8, 2015) http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/giving-credit-
credit-due-finra-improves-dispute-resolution-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/PWU8-EL9A]. 
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of federal judges and juries.189 Moreover, statistical analysis of the 
arbitration decisions indicates that on average, investors prevail 
between thirty-eight to forty-nine percent the time, and punitive 
damages are awarded in as many as 9.1% of those cases where 
investors prevailed.190 Notably, punitive damages are rarely awarded 
in securities disputes in federal courts, although they may be available 
in non-securities cases involving a financial injury.191 However, under 
the Conflict of Interest Rule, broker-dealers are prohibited from 
compelling clients to sign PDAAs,192 which have been employed by 
the securities industry since 1980s as a means of directing all 
securities disputes through FINRA arbitration, and not the federal 
courts. Under the Conflict of Interest Rule, the parties would have the 
option to bring their disputes to federal courts, although they may 
voluntarily elect FINRA arbitration. Given the low public opinion of 
the securities industry in general and of the FINRA dispute resolution 
forum in particular, the Conflict of Interest Rule has the potential to 
redirect many of the securities disputes away from the specialized 
FINRA forum. 
Further complicating the matter is the fact that courts have held 
that breach of fiduciary duty suits brought under 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(2) for ERISA plans by a participant or beneficiary may be 
maintained as class actions on behalf of all or many of the retirement 
 
189. See Laurence Shore, The Advantages of Arbitration for Banking Institutions, 14 J. 
INT’L BANKING L. 347, 347 (1999) (noting that not only is it likely that courts and juries do 
not have specific expertise in financial disputes, but they may also not be inclined to 
understand the details of the financial services field); see also Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration, 
Financial Markets and Banking Disputes, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 249 (2003) 
()(emphasizing that “[d]ue to the rapid expansion of financial activities, a judge in fact might 
not always be familiar with the new financial services and financial transactions, many of 
which can have a very technical content.”). 
190. See Choi & Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 497(discussing a 2010 study of 6,803 
securities arbitration awards which showed that claimants prevailed in 49 percent of 
arbitrations and that of those victories, three hundred and four cases, which would represent an 
incidence rate of 9.1 percent, included a punitive damages award). However, 2017 FINRA 
statistics indicate customers were awarded damages in 43 percent of cases. See Results of 
Customer Claimant Arbitration Award Cases, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/VD74-5MVL]. 
191. Choi & Eisenberg, supra note 38, ,at 503. (“Virtually all empirical studies of 
punitive damages in court-based litigation find them to be infrequently awarded, with a rate of 
. . . three to five percent of plaintiff trial wins.”). 
192. See supra Part II(A)(1), at pp. 10-11. 
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plan participants, allowing for actions seeking relief beyond just the 
individual’s personal share of losses.193 As the FINRA securities 
arbitration forum does not handle class action matters, the Conflict of 
Interest Rule provides an incentive to seek relief in federal court and 
to bring class actions. This could potentially act as a disruptor to the 
established securities dispute resolution arbitration scheme in the 
United States and adversely impact investor’s interests and public 
policy of favoring arbitration. The federal courts process does not 
have the benefit of the speed, expertise and uniformity of the FINRA 
forum. Equally important, the costs of bringing securities disputes to 
court are likely to be substantially higher.194 
FINRA’s arbitration dispute resolution is a more cost-effective 
way to resolve a securities claim than bringing a federal court claim. 
The initial fees for the two proceedings are comparable: FINRA’s 
filing fee for investors varies depending on the amount of the claim 
but starts at US$50 and is capped at US$2,250,195 as compared to the 
district court flat initial claim fee of US$400.196 FINRA’s also 
considers financial hardship arbitration fee deferrals and waivers, on a 
case by case basis.197 The securities industry also subsidizes a large 
portion of the FINRA arbitration process in each case, through the 
 
193. See Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
standing-related provisions of ERISA were not intended to limit a claimant’s right to proceed 
under Rule 23 on behalf of all individuals affected by the challenged conduct [of the 
fiduciary], regardless of the representative’s lack of participation in all the ERISA-governed 
plans involved.”); see also In re Principal U.S. Prop. Account ERISA Litig., 274 F.R.D. 649 
(S.D. Iowa 2011). 
194. See Lipner, supra note 42 (noting that biggest cost in both traditional litigation and 
in arbitration is attorney’s fees, however “[l]itigation involves so much more lawyer work than 
does arbitration” thus making arbitration a cheaper and “more streamlined” choice for 
investors); see also White v. Preferred Research, Inc., 315 S.C. 209, 212 (Ct. App. 
1993)(noting that “arbitration is not litigation carried on by other means. It is intended to be, 
and it is, an alternative means for resolving disputes without the cost and delay of a 
lawsuit.”)(emphasis added). 
195. Of note, $2,250 fee is the high watermark and only applies to disputes seeking $5 
million in damages or greater. See FINRA Rules, Rule 12900 (2007). 
196. See District Court Fee Schedule and Related Information, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/fees 
[https://perma.cc/N9W4-ST9T] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); see also Court Fees, UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, https://www.nyed.uscourts.
gov/court-fees [https://perma.cc/W2QZ-GCYN] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
197. See FINRA Rules r. 12900(a) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2014); see also 
Arbitration Fee Waivers, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, https://www.finra.
org/arbitration-and-mediation/arbitration-fee-waivers [https://perma.cc/5JDJ-6DPV]. 
1084 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:1043 
higher member filing fees and member surcharges.198 However, the 
main component of legal costs associated with both arbitration and a 
traditional court action is attorney’s fees.199 Securities transactions 
tend to be complex and require significant subject matter expertise on 
the part of the attorney, as well as extensive use of expert 
witnesses.200 Such expertise does not come cheap. Rates vary between 
US$300 and US$1,500 an hour for securities attorneys.201 Notably, in 
2013 the ABA Journal reported that “the practice area with the 
highest billing rate was finance and securities, with an average of 
US$673 an hour.”202 Furthermore, expert witness fees in a highly 
technical and complex area such as securities are likewise high, and 
may reach well over US$1,000 per hour.203 For two reasons, these 
hourly attorney’s fees and expert witness costs add up a lot more in a 
traditional court action as compared to an arbitration proceeding.204 
First, in traditional court litigation there are motions to dismiss, 
interrogatories and depositions, motions for summary judgment, pre-
 
198. See FINRA Rules r. 12900(b) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2014); FINRA Rules r. 
12901(a) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017). 
199. See Lipner, supra note 42 (noting the biggest cost in both traditional litigation and 
in arbitration is attorney’s fees, however “[l]itigation involves so much more lawyer work than 
does arbitration” thus making arbitration a cheaper and “more streamlined” choice for 
investors); see also Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil 
Litigation, 20 CT. STAT. PROJECT 7 (2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/
files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx [https://perma.cc/7Z8N-CAY2] (noting that 
traditional court trial is single most expensive component of litigation representing one-third to 
one-half of total litigation time and thus, its cost). 
200. See Lipner, supra note 42; see also Raymond W. Henney, Expert Witness 
Testimony in Securities Cases, 78 MICH. B. J., 696 (1999) (noting that “[e]xpert testimony in 
the securities area is particularly attractive because it is highly regulated, dominated by 
specialized terms, and is generally unfamiliar to jurors and many trial judges.”). 
201. Sara Randazzo, Legal Fees Cross New Mark: $1,500 an Hour, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-fees-reach-new-pinnacle-1-500-an-hour-1454960708 
202. Debra Cassens Weiss, Average Hourly Billing Rate for Partners Last Year $727 in 
Largest Law Firms, A.B.A. J., (July 15, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
average_hourly_billing_rate_for_partners_last_year_was_727_in_largest_law_f/ 
[https://perma.cc/9T7U-6QZC]. 
203. See Theresa W. Parrish, Tips for Dealing with Exorbitant Expert Witness Fees, 
A.B.A. TRIAL PRACTICE BLOG (Sept. 10, 2015), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/trialpractice/articles/summer2015-0915-tips-dealing-with-exorbitant-expert-
witness-fees.html [https://perma.cc/8R5U-5AYQ]. 
204. Susan Zuckerman, Comparing Costs in Construction Arbitration and Litigation, 62 
DISP. RESOL. J. 70, n. 4 (2007). See also Lipner, supra note 42 (noting that extensive 
discovery is the hallmark of traditional litigation and is “very pricey,” with deposition costs 
that can quickly match and exceed the cost of arbitration). 
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trial briefs, post-trial briefs, and the potential for multiple appeals, all 
of which require significant attorney’s hours and potential multiple 
rounds of expert witness work. Second, the cost of discovery in a 
traditional court proceeding is significant, especially since discovery 
motions in federal court litigation are common,205 with some outliers 
reaching as high as US$1 million.206 In arbitration, the process is 
more streamlined, since as discussed above there are limited pre-
hearing motions, very few appeals, and more simplified and limited 
rule-based discovery,207 which lead to lower procedural costs.208 
Expert testimony is permitted and often used in securities arbitration, 
however the expense associated with the use of experts is lower due 
to the more expedited nature of arbitration proceedings.209 Parties to 
the arbitration may request that the arbitration panel award the costs 
of experts, with FINRA arbitration rules and the arbitrators’ guide 
expressly providing for award of such costs.210 While securities 
 
205. See Zuckerman at 74, supra note 204.  See also Hannaford-Agor, & Waters, supra 
note 199 (noting that discovery is second most-time intensive, and thus second most 
expensive, element of civil litigation proceedings). 
206. See, e.g., Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091 (JBS/JS), 2009 WL 3446761, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009) (noting complexities associated with electronic discovery in a case 
where the defendant estimated that to meet the plaintiff’s request for e-mail production it 
would need to incur in excess of $1 million in e-mail retrieval costs). 
207. See Aaron Aizenberg, Benjamin Prinsen, FINRA Arbitration: Leveling the Playing 
Field for Investors, 90 WIS. LAW. 30, 33 (2017) (“FINRA discovery focuses almost 
exclusively on the exchange of documents. Parties do not have the right (although it can be 
requested in extraordinary circumstances) to take depositions. This can benefit parties with 
fewer resources because it prevents the more well-funded party from driving up expenses by 
serving extensive written discovery and conducting numerous depositions.”). 
208. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982)) (“The advantages of arbitration 
are many: it is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and 
evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future 
business dealings among the parties; it is more often flexible in regard to scheduling of times 
and places of future hearings and discovery devices.”); Theodore O. Rogers, Jr., Mandatory 
Pre-Dispute Arbitration: Self-Interested Critics Only Spinning Truth About a Process That 
Has Been Approved by Congress, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 5 (1998) (asserting that arbitration is “a 
congressionally approved mechanism for resolution of claims that saves all parties time and 
expense”). 
209. See Lipner, supra, note 42 (noting that a “big expense in a securities case is 
retaining the services of an expert witness to analyze the account and testify on technical 
matters. The cost of an expert can range from a few thousand dollars to tens of thousands, 
depending on the kind of case and the kind of expert.”). 
210. See FINRA Rules, r. 13902 (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2014); see also 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY Office, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
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arbitrators have the discretion to deny the allocation of expert witness 
costs,211 they often grant them,212 with some securities industry 
experts reporting that in 2016 an estimated thirty-four percent of 
arbitration decisions resulted in award of expert fees.213 Thus, recent 
hostile trends against arbitration of securities disputes in the United 
States, exemplified by the DOL Fiduciary Rule, the CFPB’s 
regulatory efforts, and most recently by the pending Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2017,214 are troubling because they “brazenly 
dismiss[] . . . the FINRA arbitration system as a mechanism to resolve 
disputes between financial professionals and their clients,” which has 
the unfortunate effect of being “good for plaintiffs’ lawyers, bad for 
investors.”215 These efforts could, over time, lead to a decline in usage 
of a highly specialized, effective, and lower cost forum. 
IV. FINRA SHOULD RESTORE PUBLIC’S CONFIDENCE IN ITS 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM BY LEARNING FROM THE UK 
AND AUSTRALIA’S SECURITIES DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROCESSES 
In the age of skepticism and hostility towards financial advice 
providers and the brokerage industry,216 it makes sense to examine 
 
ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE 70 (2017), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/arbitrators-ref-
guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DVQ-SGJJ]. 
211. See e.g., Mutual of Omaha Investor Services v. Kevin P. Pearce, Case No. 14-
00988 (2017) (FINRA Arb) (declining to award expert witness fees for unspecified reason); 
Callas Found., Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Case No. 10-00606 (2012) (FINRA Arb.) 
(declining to award expert fees due to claimant’s culpable conduct). 
212. See, e.g., Farah v Wedbush Sec. Co., Case No. 12-02469 (2013) (FINRA Arb.) 
(awarding claimant $18,500 in expert witness fees); Jaynes v. Sec. Am., Inc., Case No. 10-
03787 (2013) (FINRA Arb.) (awarding claimant $4,000 for expert witness fees); Aberlich v. 
Intervest Int’l Equities Corp., Case No. 10-00481 (2012) (FINRA Arb.) (awarding claimant 
$25,000 in expert witness fees). 
213. Dana N. Pescosolido, FINRA Customer Case Awards – Story Behind the Statistics, 
GUILIANO LAW FIRM (Jan. 30, 2017), https://securitiesarbitrations.com/finra-customer-case-
awards-story-behind-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/YL9A-ZRWP]. 
214. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 was introduced to the US Senate in March 
with the express purpose of excluding, among other things, consumer contracts for securities 
that include PDAA from being enforceable under the FAA. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, 
H.R. 1347, 115th Cong. (2017). 
215. Comment Letter from Daniel M. Gallagher, SEC Commissioner, on Proposed 
Fiduciary Rule (July 21, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015/gallagher-dol-
comment-ttr-7-21-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHK3-BYXT]. 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 5. 
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how international common law jurisdictions with developed securities 
markets address common problems in securities dispute resolution. 
We can learn from other statutory systems for securities dispute 
resolutions and adopt some of their best practices. Although the 
United States had long been a pioneer in regulation of the securities 
markets and in investor protection, the United Kingdom and Australia 
demonstrate there is a way to improve the United States’ FINRA 
securities dispute resolution process. 
First, analysis of the UK’s and Australia’s dispute resolution 
forums shows that they are absolutely free of charge to consumers. 
The fact that FINRA imposes arbitration fees on consumers is hardly 
surprising, considering the extensive nature and relative formality of 
its process. However, learning from other jurisdictions and finding a 
way to make the service free, at least for retail investors under a 
certain net worth threshold, would advance FINRA’s statutory 
obligation of safeguarding investors.217 It could also make FINRA’s 
forum more accessible to the small individual retail investors who 
may not be attractive plaintiffs for attorneys working on a contingent 
fee basis.218 Currently, FINRA’s half measure is to consider financial 
hardship arbitration fee deferrals and waivers.219 However, no criteria 
is set forth as to who would qualify, and no statistics are available as 
to how many investors were able to obtain deferrals and waivers.220 
The securities industry already subsidizes a large portion of the 
FINRA arbitration process in each case, through the higher member 
filing fees and member surcharges.221 In the interest of making 
securities dispute arbitration forum more accessible, it would seem 
that asking the industry to fund all of it would not be too far-fetched. 
Some may argue that making FINRA’s arbitration process free 
of charge may encourage more arbitration claims as American 
investors are part of the society that is already known for being 
 
217. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) ()(2012). See also Our Mission, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY, https://www.finra.org/about/our-mission [https://perma.cc/R8D7-
ERXL]. 
218. See Lipner supra, note 42 (“A lawyer’s willingness to accept a case on a 
contingency depends on not just the lawyer’s perception of the merit of the case, but also its 
size.”). 
219. See FINRA Rules r.12900(a) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2014). 
220. Id. 
221. See FINRA Rules r.12900(b) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2014); FINRA Rules 
r.12901(a) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2017). 
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notoriously litigious.222 This could be partially mitigated, however, 
through an implementation of the eligibility requirement akin to that 
of the UK and Australian securities dispute resolution forums. Prior to 
being eligible to bring a FINRA securities arbitration claim, all 
investors should be first required to go through the internal complaint 
review mechanisms that the financial service providers maintain, and 
financial services providers should be given a reasonable amount of 
time to resolve the dispute before FINRA accepts it into arbitration. 
Second, both the United Kingdom and Australia require their 
securities dispute resolution agencies to provide parties in a securities 
dispute with the reasoning for their decision. Requiring rather than 
permitting rationale for the arbitration decisions in the United States 
makes a lot of sense and would aid greatly in making FINRA’s 
process more transparent, as well as help facilitate clearer 
precedential value of arbitration decisions. Indeed, reasoned decisions 
make particular sense in the United States, because unlike the 
securities dispute resolution processes in the United Kingdom and 
Australia, the US securities dispute resolution process is binding on 
all parties,223 and US arbitration awards may only be appealed on very 
limited grounds.224 Hence, a written record of rationale used to 
achieve a particular arbitration decision is critical because its absence 
undermines the confidence of the parties in the objectivity of the 
arbitration process, and makes it difficult to challenge FINRA 
arbitration decisions in case of injustice. A countervailing argument to 
this recommendation for explained opinions is that written opinions 
will be used as a conduit for appeals, and will slow down the 
arbitration process.225 However, arbitration awards may only be 
appealed on very limited grounds, and courts accord great deference 
to arbitration decisions.226 As to the delay that written arbitration 
 
222. While the litigiousness of the American society is most pronounced in tort 
litigation, this litigiousness is also pervasive in other areas of the law. See Procek v. Hudak, 
No. 2000 WL 546079, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2000) (noting that the “people so common in 
today’s litigious America [are] willing to march to a lawyer’s office at the slightest hint of 
legal conflict”). For a more in-depth analysis of the American notoriety in litigation, see J. 
Mark Ramseyer, Eric Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation Rates, (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. 
For Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 681,  2010), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf. 
223. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 61, 62. 
225. See Katsoris supra note 6, at 459-60. 
226. See supra Part II(A)(2) at pp. 20-21; see also supra text accompanying notes 61, 62. 
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opinions may introduce to the FINRA process, a solution proposed 
below addresses how this can be mitigated. 
FINRA’s securities disputes resolution process, while more 
streamlined than US federal court litigation, is significantly more 
formal, and thus time-consuming, when compared to the United 
Kingdom and Australia’s securities dispute resolution forums. 
FINRA’s average turnaround time of 14.5 months is considerably 
longer than the UK’s FOS reported average of just under twelve 
months, and Australia’s FOSA and CIO reported averages of three 
and six months, respectively. FINRA could optimize the process by 
further simplifying its evidentiary, discovery and hearing procedures, 
and borrowing a page from the UK’s FOS or Australia’s CIO, which 
only order hearings if they believe it is the most efficient way to 
resolve a dispute. Such streamlining may be perceived as 
undermining the structural protections for the benefit of retail 
investors. However, FINRA could overcome the objections from the 
plaintiffs’ representatives by making the right to eliminate certain 
hearings or components of the discovery and evidentiary procedures 
unilateral to retail investor plaintiffs.  
With that said, FINRA’s process is effective in many ways, and 
the United Kingdom and Australia can likewise learn from the United 
States and FINRA. Allowing securities arbitration awards in both 
United Kingdom and Australia’s forums to be non-binding on 
investors may invite abuse and forum – shopping, and could waste 
taxpayers’ money. FINRA’s policy that all arbitration decisions are 
binding on both parties is a sound policy that encourages efficient use 
of resources and promotes judicial economy. Furthermore, FINRA 
should be applauded for making securities dispute decisions publicly 
available. United Kingdom and Australia provide parties to a dispute 
with reasoned decisions, but do not make them publicly available. 
This does not help foster public transparency into the securities 
dispute resolution process. FINRA should continue to maintain a 
public database of all securities arbitration decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In summary, FINRA should: (a) make its securities disputes 
resolution forum free of charge for retail investors, at least under a 
certain net worth threshold; (b) mitigate potential for increase in 
arbitrations by adopting an eligibility criteria requiring claimants to 
work with the financial services provider for a reasonable period of 
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time before commencing arbitration; (c) mandate rather than permit 
that all FINRA arbitrators provide rationale for their decisions and 
prepare written explanations, which should be made publicly 
available; (d) optimize its discovery, evidentiary and hearing 
processes so that the forum is more competitive and prompt; 
(e)maintain the policy of making all of its arbitration decisions 
binding, and continue to provide public access to its decisions. Taking 
these steps will help shore up the confidence of the investing public in 
the integrity of the FINRA securities dispute resolution process and 
enable FINRA to finally shake off its villain image and make the 
United States the golden child of the securities dispute resolution 
family. 
 
